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• FOREWORD
In 1819, the United Staxes ship S.S. SAVANNAH made
the first crossing of the Atlantic assisted "by a small
steam engine. It was a daring enterprise sponsored by
American shipping interests. This first venture with a
new technology proved to be a commercial failure ana the
engine and boiler were removed to make room for addition-
al cargo . SAVANNAH ended her days as a conventional
sailing snip.
Twenty years laxer, the British ship SIRIUS crossed
the Atlantic propelled entirely by steam. Thus began
the development of the powerful Brixish steam propelled
merchanx fleet and seventy-five years of maritime domi-
nanc e
.
Now one hundred and fifty years later, it may be
that history is repeating ixself.
IX
ABSTKACT
The dominant purpose of this study is a realistic
examination of the economic feasibility of merchant ship
nuclear power ana its relevance to the present state of
crisis in the merchant marine of the United States.
The study reviews the origins and current status
of U.S. maritime law, its archaic system of direct and
indirect subsidies which tries to maintain U.S. ship-
ping interests on a competitive basis with foreign
nations, and the failure of this system as evidenced by
the post-war decline and present abject state of our
merchant fleet. It underscores the principal causes
for maritime decay as high costs of construction and
operation under the U.S. flag, labor strife, antiquated
legislation and the failure to agree on a course of
remedial action. It is suggested that the merchant
marine of the United States which today carries only
l°/o of our total import and export trade, be revitalized
in the interest of national necessity.
An examination of the current state of world mer-
chant ship nuclear power is conducted and it is conclu-
ded that leadership in maritime nuclear propulsion has
passed into the hands of other nations. A representa-
tive sample of the forces that control the future of
merchant ship nuclear power in the United States is pre-
sented. This sample indicates that the positions and
attitudes of these forces are in conflict and that the
result is complete stagnation of a merchant ship reac-
tors program.
The study then describes the construction and op-
eration of a mathematical model of a hypothetical, but
realistically configured contemporary merchantman in
which all costs of construction and operation are con-
tained. The model is operated under identical condi-
tions in both a conventional and nuclear mode ana the
results of operations are economically compared.
x
A sensitivity analysis of realistic variables is
conducted to determine those operational factors that
control the competitive environment between nuclear pro-
pulsion and oil fired snips. The results of operation
ana sensitivity analysis find that nigh power, long trade
routes, short turnaround time and high reactor utiliza-
tion are the requirements for competitive maritime nuc-
clear power and that these requirements are not met in
the ship under study.
A review of recent estimates and forecasts for the
supply and demand of fossil fuels is conducted. As as-
sessment of these forecasts indicates that the world
bank of fossil energy is being rapidly depleted, part-
icularly in the case of oil. The importance of these
diminishing reserves to the transportation industry,
with particular emphasis on ocean commerce is explored.
The study concludes that there is no competitive
basis for nuclear propulsion on contemporary merchant
ships since the conditions for economic parity with
conventional installations cannot be realistically met.
a review of current changes in the maritime industry is
made, and it is suggested that a new concept in total
transportation is emerging which sees the snip as a sub-
system rather than an economic entity. This review
suggests that the requirements of this new maritime
concept are moving in a direction that will meet the
conditions for competitive merchant ship nuclear power.
A conditional merchant ship nuclear power program
is recommended and described. The program calls for
government support for a research and development pro-
gram that will result in a packaged nuclear steam supply
system for installation in a series of selected snips
whose characteristics meet the conditions for competi-
tive nuclear power. The basic conditions for govern-
ment support are the acceptance of standardization of
design to achieve the economies of volume ana that ship-
owners demonstrate that a need exists for ships that
meet the conditions for economic parity.
xi
PART I.
INTRODUCTION AND HISTORICAL REVIEW
A. Preface
The interlace between nuclear propulsion and its po-
tential application to commercial marine use cannot be
stuuied in isolation from pertinent history. The purpose
of this part is to acquaint the reader with the basic back-
ground of United States maritime law so that subsequent
sections of this paper are put in proper context.
13 . The U.S. Merchant Marine Act of 193 6
The constitution of U.S. maritime policy is the Mer-
chant Marine Act of 1936. The lav/ was passed because ship-
building and wage costs had priced the privately owned U.S.
merchant fleet out of competition with foreign flags. In
an attempt to stem the decline of the U.S. Merchant Marine,
the Act of 1936 introduced a system of differential sub-
sidies for the construction and operation of cargo liners
on specified essential trade 'routes
.
But the Merchant Marine Act served a broader purpose
than the surface aspects of economic competition with for-
eign nations. It declared the maritime policy of this
country to be that the United States should never be at the
mercy of foreign ships or foreign shipyards. It recognized
that an efficient and economic national merchant fleet and
shipbuilding industry were essential to our defense posture
Its concepts called for a U.S. -built, U.S. -owned and U.S.—
manned fleet of merchant ships capable of transporting this
country's domestic waterborne commerce, a substantial por-
tion of its foreign trade and supporting the armed forces
5*
as an effective auxiliary in time of national crisis.
Revision of the Merchant Marine Act is the center of
an epic controversy between and among elements of govern-
ment, shipowners and shipbuilders in the United States
today. It is not the purpose of the Act which is contest-
ed, but its provisions for subsidy.
Throughout this thesis, superscript numbers refer to the
similarly numbered items in PART VIII, LITERATURE CITED,
used in support of statements preceding the superscript
number
.
. Subsidy Provisions of the Merchant Marine Acs
The range and variety of government aids to the mar-
itime industry is complex and no purpose will be served by
a detailed presentation in this study. The basic subsidy




1 • Construction Subsidy
Under the authority of Title V, provision is made for
a construction differential subsidy for ships engaged in
foreign commerce. This subsidy is limited to 55^ for car-
go liners and 60?3 for passenger ships. The purpose of the
subsidy is to enable American shipowners to construct ships
in xhe United States on a parity with their foreign com-
petitors. Funds appropriated for this purpose amounted to
$143,000,000.00 in 1963. 5
2. Operating subsidy
Like the construction subsidy, the operating differen-
tial subsidy is given to ship operators to place American
vessels on a par with those of foreign competitors. The
amount of this subsidy is based on the difference between
the fair and reasonable cost of insurance, maintenance, re-
pairs, wages and subsi stance and the estimated cost of the
same items if the ship were operated under foreign registry.
Any profits made in excess of 10$& are recaptured by the gov-
ernment to the extent of 50$. Punds appropriated for this




Section 511 of the Act provides for the establishment
of construction reserve funds. Shipowners may deposit pro-
ceeds from the sale or indemnities from the loss of ships
into this fund. Any gain on such a transaction is tax-free
if the deposits are used for the construction, reconstruc-
tion or acquisition of another ship within a specified time.
The allowable depreciation on the new ship is reduced by the
amount of gain.
Operators receiving operating differential subsidy ob-
tain tax concessions for the deposit of earnings into res-
5erve funds. Under the authority of section 607(h) of the
Act, all such deposits of earnings, including capital gains,
are tax deferred. Thus, so long as an operating differ-
ential subsidy agreement remains in effect and no earnings
are withdrawn for purposes other than the construction,
reconstruction of acquisition of a new ship, these " tax-
deferred" earnings are in effect, tax exempt. If earnings
are withdrawn for any other purpose, they are taxable as
if earned in the year of withdrawal.
4-. Other Su'o'oorts
Additional aid is granted to U.S. shipowners in the
form of new investment tax credits, government insurance
of commercial loans and mortgages for the construction or
reconstruction of ships, direct loans for subsidized con-
struction at attractive interest rates, acquisition by the
government of privately owned obsolete vessels in exchange
for an allowance of credit to the shipowner or shipbuilder
on new ships and preferential routing of government-owned
or financed cargoes on U.S. -flag commercial ships.
The reader now has some appreciation for the awesome
extent of government support to the United States maritime
industry. The scope of this aid can be further appreciated
by comparison to the assistance provided "oy other prominent
maritime nations to ships carrying tneir flag. This data
is presented in Table I on the following page.
TABLE x
SUMMARY 01? GOVERNMENT AIDS TO MARITIME INDUSTRIES
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D. .ne 'ailure of the United States Maritime Program
Despite the injection of nearly five billion dollars in
- „
n
suosiay money during tne past 30 years, ' the maritime pro-
gram of the United States is bankrupt by any standards.
Depending on viewpoint, this failure is because or in spite
of the concept of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936.
1 • ^he Present S tate of the U.S. Merchant Marine
The United States has a recurrent history of post-war
maritime decay and there is no more eloquent testimony to
the magnitude of this American tragedy tnan a review of the
familiar pattern that emerged from World War II. When the
U.S. entered the hostilities, our merchant marine base was
totally inadequate to the logistic need. A merchant fleet
was constructed on a crash basis at a staggering cost. These
ships and tne men who sailed and died in tnem performed an
heroic task. Following the war, the usual sacred' oaths
were taken that this must not happen again. It has.
The U.S. active flag fleet which consists of privately
owned ships and government vessels not in the National Def-
ense Reserve Fleet has dwindled from 1617 ships in 1950 to
1167 in 1966. This represents a decline of from 14.1 fa of
the world fleet to 6.8%. Table II shows the number of U.S.
ships and their percentage relative to tne world fleet dur-
ing this period:
TABLE II 8
POST WAR DECLINE 0? THE U.S. MERCHANT MARINE
1950 1966 : ;
TANKERS 1 457 (21.5/0 277 (7.7/0
BULK CAR HS 54 ( 9.6/0 57 (2.7/0
FREIGHTERS 1049 (13.6JO 804 (7.5/0
H/C Altu
______
57 (5.2%) 29 (3.4%) |




3y contrast, some of our world war friends and foes
have had a different post—war experience as indicated by
Table III:
TABLE III8
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A comparison of the U.S. merchant marine with, that of
the U.S.S.R. today is an enervating experience. The num-
ber of U.S. active flag ships has now reduced to some
7 ,
1 11 5 ships and more than 90°/o of these are 20 years old
q .
or older. These ships are carrying little more than 7%
of the total United States foreign waterborne import and
5
export trade. Our present rate of ship construction is
about 12 per year. At that rate, the U.S. will have an
active ileet of some 357 shius oy 1972.
The number of merchantmen flying the ensign of the
Soviet Union has grown to over 14-00 ships and of these,
7
approximately 58°/o have been built since 1958. The U.S.S.R.
is now building ships at the rate of about 100 annually.
Russia had declared a shipping war on the west and
there is little doubt that she means to win. One of her
initial targets is the Europe-Australia trade and passen-
ger routes. Russian merchant ships are offering European
wool importers shipping rates 15^ below competition. Soviet
passenger fares are about 3150 lower than the lowest price
charged by the British and Western Europe lines. Ironically,
some of these ships are homeward bound after having unloaded
war materials on the docks of Haiphong.
7Despite previous predictions by the Department of Def-
ense to the contrary, 98% oi our war materials to Viet Ham
and two -thirds oi our troop strength in that area have he en
transported by sealift. Our merchant fleet has not been
equal to the task. To provide today's military sealift req-
uirements, a poiygenetic fleet has oeen assembled consis-
ting of some 144 ships from the aging National Defense
Reserve Fleet (NDHP), 27 Military Sea Transportation ser-
vice (LISTS) freighters, 25 IvISTS tankers and about 20 for-
eign flag tankers in addition to about 4-5'/" of the privately
owned U.S. general cargo fleet and 25/* of the U.S. private
tanker fleet.
Commenting on the adequacy of the NDRF to meet Viet
Nam sealift requirements, the Maritime Administration
stated
:
"...it is more meaningful to say that unless the reserve
fleet is replaced, there won't be a reserve fleet due to
its age and state of repair."
2 . The Present state of the U.S. Shipbuilding Industry
Prom the foregoing, it should come as no surprise to
learn that the United States is not the leader in world
ship construction. Estimates of her actual position vary
ip 5from 8th to 14th. In any event, it is not position on
a scale that matters; what counts is how much business
you are doing. Lloyd's Register of Shipping sets present
world shipyard orders at a record high of 40,632,120 tons.
The U.S. received only 3;^> of these orders. The world




Shipyard Orders in Hand (1968) '
JAPAN 1 7 , 646 , 1 89 tons
SWEDEN 3 , 001 , 233 tons
vv. GERMANY 2,587,9 23 tons
FRANC? 2,456,588 "cons
U.K. 2,094,000 tons
TTl "' "\^—jm-—^—. mBr^r^gg-A -..i.a^tf-aa«TTniiaiTr~afiT7r*n n
-
T| r- ..rr, .r„ .^,
8E . The Caus es of failure
There is a plethora of reasons why the maritime pro-
gram of tne united btaxes has failed and each is worthy of
a dissertation. This study will confine itself to a brief
discussion of tne principal causes.
1 . high Costs
The U.S. Merchant Marine is unable to compete on the
world market now for the same reason it could not in 1936.
It costs about twice as much to build and operate a ship
under the U.S. flag as under foreign registry. An exam-
ple will serve to illustrate the point. On 1 November,
1963, contracts were signed for the construction of three
common carrier freight snips ^oy the General Dynamics Corp-
oration for the Lykes Brothers Steamship Company, Inc.
Scheduled for completion in 1971, the construction price
is $32,617,333 .00 each. The government is paying for 55$
of this cost under the construction differential subsidy
provisions of the merchant marine Act of 1936. Lykes
president, Prank A. Nemec, said the cost for constructing
these same ships in Japan would have 'oeen about 313.5
million each, but the Lykes Company is building them in
tne United States to oe eligible for continued subsidy.
By "continued subsidy", Mr. Nemec is not referring to the
55% already committed 'oy the government to the construction
cost of these ships; he is undoubtedly referring to the
operating differential subsidy his ships will be eligible
for oy virtue of being built in the United States. The
law prohibits foreign built ships from eligibility for
the operating subsidy.
Unfortunately, the high cost of U.S. involvement does
not end with construction. For the twenty to twenty-five
years of the ship's life after completion, she faces the
additional competition of operating costs. An example of
the degree of this competition is presented in Table V on
the following page.
J. ixjj J-iiii V
COMPARATIVE COST AND PERCENT (#) OP TOTAL COST OP OPERATING A



















•»w-ti irf.'^-anifc* -ia- i', 7a.,. r.-nBifc^
Ai\iiN JaL Co
—----•— **- g - —
-Vm,






iT..."ir.g"7 <• i i~ r • -£^
$612,000 (40) § $1184,000 (29)1 #232,000







105,000 ( 7) 47,000 ( 7)1

























*1 Typical modern out non-automated bulk carrier.
*2 Straight line basis over a 20 year period.
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2. Labor Strife
The cost and conduct of American maritime labor is a
pervading factor in tne failure of the maritime program.
As shown in Table V, the wage differential between American
seamen and those of other nationalities is staggering; for
one of the comparative examples, the wages paid to the U.S.
crew nearly equal the total annual operating cost of the
other.
After returning to her service facilities in Galveston
in 1963, labor disputes broke out on the nuclear ship 17 - S
•
SAVANNAH. These disputes centered on pay differentials
between the engineering and deck departments. The strike
could not be settled. 'As a result, the ship was immobil-
ized for a year. The government was forced to start ail
over again with a new General Agent for operation of the
ship. Contracts had to be negotiated with different mar-
itime unions and a new crew had to be trained to operate
14the ship. During tne second year of experimental oper-
ation, 1 966-1 967, the average wage paid to the 66 man
14
crew of SAVANNAH exceeded 318,000.00.'
The United States had demonstrated the peaceful use
of the atom to the world through operation of the SAVANNAH;
it had demonstrated something else to prospective nuclear
merchant snip operators in this country.
In a statement before the Subcommittee on Merchant
Marine of the U.S. Senate on 10 Kay 1968, the Secretary of
Transportation, Alan S. Boyd, summed up the problem of
maritime labor:
"If the U.S. merchant marine is to respond to the needs
of the American snipper, both management and labor must work
closely to eliminate tne recurring interruptions in service
caused by work stoppages. Such interruptions destroy con-
fidence in U.S. -flag carriers. Shippers consequently turn
to foreign-flag vessels for their needs.
A series of labor-management agreements, negotiated in
1965 to help assure wage stability, have in practice accom-
plished the opposite. Under these agreements, if tne mem-
bers of one union receive a v/age increase or other benefit,
other maritime unions can reopen their contracts through a
•me too' clause and demand arbitration to ootain a matching
increase. By the time several unions have received such in-
creases, the first union is in a position to assert that it
is once again behind the others - and the eye! - starts all
over again."
" Because of this practice, employment costs in the
industry nave risen more than 30/o since 1965. These costs
increase federal expenditures through tne operating sub-
sidy program and shipping costs of Government cargoes.
They diminish the ability of tne U.S. merchant marine to
compete with foreign fleets, hot only do spiraiing employ-
ment costs threaten the industry with economic ruin, tney
imperil the American public as well, for tney nave a shat-
tering impact on our Nation's wage-price stabilization
objectives.
"
3 . Outmoded Legislation
When the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 was drafted by
Congressman Joseph P. Kennedy, American-flag ships were
carrying about one-third of U.S. foreign trade. One of
the expectations of tne legislation was an increase in this
share to about 50^>. une of the important reasons that we
are carrying little more than 7fo today is not the faulty
vision of the framers of this law, but rather the failure
of succeeding governments to maintain this legislation
in an up-dated condition.
One of the fundamental concepts of the Act of 1936
was that its provisions extended only to cargo liners
engaged in foreign commerce. There was justification for
this position. In the 1930 's there was no American dry
cargo bulk carrier fleet; we were marginal exporters of
the great bulk staples of grain and coal. In addition,
there was only the barest beginning of an independent
tanker fleet. This concept was further reinforced when
in 1937, Chairman Kennedy reported that a study of tramp
shipping indicated that it would soon disappear in favor
of cargo liners. The Act took no cognizance of government
cargo since in the 50 "s, there was no important movement
of government commodities in commercial ships.
Conditions changed. In 1966, dry bulk cargo in our
foreign trade amounted to some 206 million tons. Tanker
cargoes in foreign trade increased to 14-7 million tons.
Today, the Department of Commerce estimates that by 1985*
dry bulk cargoes will rise in volume to 581 million tons
and tanker cargoes to 235 million tons. The volume of
ra
12
government cargoes has become astronomical. The U.S. gov-
ernment is today the world's largest snipper.''
Yet, despite These major changes in the U.S. maritime
environment, The basic clauses of the Act of 1936 remain
essentially unchanged. Cargo liners are still the only
ships eligible for construction and operating differential
subsidies. The failure to change the law to meet changing
condition f^-.r, had a very dramatic effect, sine© they are
not eligible for subsidy under American lav/, U.S. owners
of bulk carriers and Tankers have sought the more favorable
economic climate of "flags of convenience" - Panama, Lib-
eria and Honduras.
Today, Liberia registers 1429 ships accounting for
8.3$ of the world fleet. This is larger than the U.S.
active fleet. Table VI shows the number and type of ship
under American management in the PanLibHon registry:
j. A-Dl.i!i V 1a vt 8
U.S. OWNED SKIPS UNDER FLAGS 0? CONVENIENCE







TOTALS 196 278 474
—~. -~ izj — ———*
Unfortunately, it cannot be reported that correction
of this failure is imminent; both House and Senate Bills
introduced for tnis purpose during the last session of
Congress failed to be enacted. Versions of both These
bills were firsT introduced in 1963. Is it possible that
"America's leaders have found the subject of a merchant
marine to be too complicaTed for correction"? -*
4. The Other Side of Subsidy
n,
!o objectively examine the causes for failure of the
U.S. maritime program, it must be reported that there is a
body of opinion that believes that the concept of subsidi-
zation contained in the Act of 1936 is a direct cause of
failure. This opinion feels that merchant marine and ship-
building industry dependence on subsidy has fostered out-
moded and uneconomical practices. Certainly it is no sur-
prise that the mainstream of this thinking is the agency •
that must pay the subsidy.
Secretary of Transportation Boyd, representing the
Johnson Administration, made the case for a new look at
government support:
"Enduring through the years as a tradition, the mer-
chant marine has declined as an industry. Its decline
parallels its increasing dependence on Government support
through subsidies of one Kind or another. Subsidies -
direct and indirect - have been a compromise answer to a
difficult situation. They nave prevented ootn tne death
and the nationalization of the merchant marine."
"The subsidy system itself is in clear neoc, of reform.
Instead of encouraging innovation and productivity., the sys-
tem focuses attention on the subsidy dollar as a source of
income. A new system must be found that will induce the
industry to take full advantage of advancing technology,
management ingenuity, and the resources of a skilled labor
force
.
The Government now subsidizes tne snip operator to
make up the differences between certain elements of his
operating costs and tnose of his foreign competitors.
This process has proven inadequate and unsound. ?or ex-
ample: It requires a network of Government auditors in the
steamship company's offices, as well as an overseas staff
of Government employees to provide estimates of foreign
operating costs.
It imposes cumbersome administrative procedures upon
the operator, who is forced to make a detailed justification
for each of his subsidy-related costs.
It requires strict adherence to trade routes and rest-
ricts the operator from t aking advantage of shifting mar-
ket conditions.
It gives the operator little incentive to hold down
costs, since increases are borne by the Government . " 6
Although there is probably much validity in the pre-
vious Administration's position, Mr. Boyd did not make it
clear how reduction of subsidy would "encourage innovation
and productivity" while going out of business.
H2 • ^no failure g.l' Af^reement
Last, but certainly not 'one least in importance is
the failure of the government, shipowners, shipbuilders,
maritime labor and ail manner of merchant marine interests
to agree collective.!:/ or individually on what must be-
done to solve the maritime problem. The harangue of pro-
posal and counter-proposal is seemingly endless. 'The
exigency of the matter requires that it not be endless,
'with each year of indecision and uncertainty, our mer-
chant marine declines and we are becoming more and more





The United States Merchant Marine faces a double
crisis - one of condition and one of decision.
The crisis of condition consists of simple definition:
block obsolescence , of our merchant fleet and increasing
dependence on ships of foreign origin to transport the
stuff of our ocean commerce.
±he crisis of decision is more difficult. Pirst, we
must decide whether to correct the state of our merchant
marine oy renovating the maritime program or whether to
repeal the principle of the Merchant Marine Act of 1956
either by deliberate legislative act or ~oy failure to
act at all. 'while this latter course has not been overtly
taken, the failure to agree on and execute a plan of
action has had the same effect.
This paper assumes that the decision to rebuild the
merchant marine industry will be an affirmative one. This
assumption is based on three factors:
1
.
The national interests of a country that must import
1666 of 77 strategic materials and which is isolated
from its allies 'ay the world's oceans demand it.
2. Tne future logistic needs of an exploding global pop-
ulation leaves no realistic alternative for the phy-
sical and economic safety of our people.
3. The present administration is committed to a revit-
ilization of the maritime industry.
Second then, the nation must decide how to rebuild.
This is the principle thrust of this study. This paper
will seek to establish that the choice is between an est-
ablished but short-lived technology and a new but expensive
one and that in the final analysis, the choice is not one
of technologies, but vision.
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G . The Objectives of this Study
The dominant purpose of this work is an objective,
realistic appraisal of trie economic feasibility of mer-
chant ship nuclear power . This investigation will take
the following form:
1 . An examination of the ent status of world merchant
ship nuclear power and a representative sampling of
the attitudes and positions within the United States
that control the choice between conventional or nuc-
lear reconstruction of our merchant marine.
2. The construction, description and operation of a math-
ematical model of a hypothetical, but realistically
configured contemporary merchant ship in both a con-
ventional and nuclear mode.
5. An objective examination of the comparative economics
that result from operation of the model under identi-
cal circumstances.
4. The conduct of a sensitivity analysis of those factors
which are realistically variable and which bear dir-
ectly on the choice between the alternatives.
5. The review of estimates and forecasts for the supply
and demand of fossil fuel energy and an assessment
of their meaning to the future of maritime commerce.
6. To suggest in summation how the decision between recon-
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N.S. SAVANNAH was launched ~ny the New York Shipbuild-
ing Corporation on 21 July, 19 59* when SAVANNAH v/aa turnod
over to the government's general agent for operation, the
Maritime Administration ana the Atomic Energy Commission
had spent $55 million dollars. Prom Pebruary 196 2 until
August 1968, SAVANNAH travelled more than 333,000 miles and
burned 122 pounds of uranium, the equivalent of 21,500,000
gallons of oil fuel. She completed her first shuffle re-
fueling at the special servicing complex owned by the gov-
ernment and operated by the Todd Shipyards Corporation in
October 1968 at Galveston, Texas. Now returned xo sea,
SAVANNAH remains the United S-tates' sole operating appli-
cation of commercial marine nuclear propulsion. No fol-
low-on ships are being constructed and none are in plan-
ning. 13 ' 17 ' 18
2 w est C-ermany
Europe's first nuclear powered freighter, OTTO HAHN
made her first voyage on 12 October 1968. She is a 25,900
ton iron ore carrier, smaller and slower than SAVANNAH,
but with an advanced reactor built oy the Deutsche Dab-
cock and Wilcox, Oberhausen (not connected with the U.S.
B&W) and Interatom. Her principal mission is the training
of V.'est Germany's cadre of nuclear ship crews. She will
carry ore from Narvik, Norway to Bremen, Rotterdam and
other routes to offset her construction cost of $13.8
million dollars. OTTO HAHN is 564- feet long with a beam
of 77 feet and a draft of 30.2 feet. Her cruising speed
of 15-7 knots is provided ~oy steam driven turbines of
10,000 SHP. German reactor engineers forecast that in
the next decade, 50,000-100,000 SHP nuclear merchant ships





On 27 November 1968, the keel was laid Tor Japan's
first atomic powered merchant ship at the Tokyo works of
Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries Ltd. The Japan Nuc-
lear Ship Developement Agency plans to complete the ship
'ay 1972^ construction cost is reported at $T5»6 million
dollars. The 36 megawatt pressurized water reactor win
be manufactured by the Mitsubishi Atomic Power Industries.
Like OTTO HAHN, the Japanese ship win serve in the dual
capacity of freighter and training ship. The ship will be
429 feet in len^zh with a beam of 63 feet and a depth of 4-3.5
feet. A 1u,uuu SH? steam turbine will drive the ship at
a cruising speed of 16.5 knots. It is reported that the
Japanese governement win pay for three-quarters of the
building cost and industry the remainder. Japanese govern-
ment agencies have expressed interest in constructing a
nuclear powered container ship able to carry 1 , uou con-
13 18 19tainers at 30 knots in the mid 1970 • s. ' '
4. Italy
I... ii iU
A cooperative consisting of the Italian Navy and the.
National Commission for Atomic Energy has agreed to con-
struct an 18,0u0 ton nuclear merchant ship to be designed,
financed and operated by the Navy. Tentatively named
ENRICO FERMI, this 20 knot ship will be propelled ay 22,000
SH? steam turbines supplied by a pressurized water reactor.
One of her primary missions will be the training of civilian
seamen in nuclear power. The ship will be 574 feet in length
1 ft
with a beam of 77 feet and a depth of 44 feet.
There has been considerable debate in the United States
as to whether we have lost the lead in maritime nuclear pow-
er by failure to follow-up SAVANNAH with second generation
snips. The activities of the three countries described
above make it clear there is little left to debate about.
Paradoxically, it win be remembered that some 25 years ago,
the three countries above were referred to as the "axis
powers". While the implication of political alignment is




Positions a.nd Attitud e on Merchant Ship I.'ucle-rr Po '.v er
i ii tn e u r.i t e c S t a t e s
There is a triumverate of power in the United States
that controls the destiny of commercial marine nuclear pro-
pulsion. It is necessary to understand the mood and inter-
ests of these forces in order to assess the prospec ts for
merchant ship nuclear power.
1 . The Government
a. Congress
In 1963 } Congressman Edward A. G-armatz, Chairman of
the house Subcommittee on Merchant Marine introduced mer-
chant marine reform legislation (K.R. 1071 ) that included
strong support for merchant ship nuclear power. A compan-
ion bill was introduced in the Senate by Senator Beall
the following year (S.2795).
Thi legislation amended the Merchant Marine Act of
1956 by adding a new Title X. The purpose of the new title
was to foster "the development, construction, and operation
of privately owned nuclear powered merchant ships wnose de-
signs emb'ody significant departures from the designs of ex-
isting nuclear powered merchant ships which may lead to re-
duction of the cost of constructing and operating future nuc-
21
ciear powered merchant snips."
Significant design departures included, but were not
limited to
:
(1) reactor systems not yet demonstrated aboard ship which
have potentially greater economic efficiency,
(2) decreased weight per power output,
(3) extension of power range appreciably above, or reduc-
tion of power range below, the power ranges of exist-
ing nuclear powered merchant ships,
(4-) utilization of multiple reactor systems,
(5) major modifications in design, arrangement, fabrication
or operating techniques, and
(6) engineering of an existing reactor concept into a new
21
snip type not previously adapted to nuclear power.
20
Even a casual review of these requirements indicates
that only slight movement in the state of the art over that
embodied in SAVANNAH would be sufficient to qualify for the
aid provisions of this legislation.
Providing the prerequisites are net, the Secretary of
Commerce is authorized to:
(1) pay ail or part of the excess of development costs,
inducing first fuel core, over the cost of develop-
ing a comparable conventional snip and,
(2) pay all or part of the excess of construction costs
in the United States, including first fuel core, over
the cost of foreign construction of a comparable con-
ventional snip.
In addition, the legislation authorizes the Secretary
to assist in the training of crews, plan and design shore
service facilities, provide appropriate classified infor-
mation, provide government research and development fac-
ilities, design review services, snip construction ins-
pection services ana snip operation advisory services.
This legislation put prospective nuclear powered mer-
chant ship operators on a par, or perhaps even slightly
ahead of, conventional shipowners.
These bills were not enacted and have ~oae~n re-intro-
duced and defeated during each subsequent session of Con-
gress. They have 'oQert introduced again during the present
session, and one of the house versions (H.R. 782) in inc-
luded in this study as APPENDIX A for the interested read-
er.
Although the attitude of the present administration
with respect to merchant ship nuclear power is not known,






On 20 Kay 1968, hearings were begun before the Sub-
committee on Merchant Marine of the U.S. Senate on S.26 50,
a Dill to amend the Merchant Marine Act of 1956 and other
statutes to provide a new maritime program. S.2650 cont-
ained provisions for merchant ship nuclear support as des-
cribed in the previous section of this study. Alan S. Boyd,
Secretary of Transportation, represented the administra-
tion. Following a reading of the proposed legislation,
Secretary Boyd introduced the administration's version of
the bill. It did not contain the word "nuclear". The only
allusion to the subject of merchant ship nuclear power was
contained in Mr. Boyd's prepared statement:
"There is serious doubt as to the attractiveness and
wisdom of proceeding with a broader nuclear ship program
at the present time. It appears that power reactors of
the relatively small sizes required 'for merchant ship pro-
pulsion will continue to be noncompetitive with oil over
the foreseeable future." 6
ho substantiating data were presented for this pos-
ition, thus the administration's position must be taken
as given.
c • Atomic Energy Commission
Some history and much concentration is required to
understand the Commission's stand on maritime nuclear po-
wer. In hearings before the Joint Committee on Atomic
Bnergy in 196 5 on the development, growth and state of the
atomic energy industry, the position of the ABC towards
maritime nuclear power was presented, oy Commissioner Ramey:
"we believe that the Commission has now embarked on a
realistic and readily understandable program.
V/e have proposed a two-prong approach. The first is
the Commission's research and development program for an
advanced civilian maritime reactor plant facility and, the
second, is our cooperation with the Maritime Administra-
tion on their nuclear shipbuilding program.
xfie objective of the research and development program
is to obtain an economical, highly reliable, and safe mar-
itime plant that will be competitive with fossil-fueled pro-
pulsion plants. Under this program we expect to build a
land-based test facility, a laboratory, in fact) where we
can focus our development fforts, and design, build, and
operate an advanced-type plant and identify, develop, and
test future necessary improvements, particularly in comp-
22
ponents and layouts, for civilian ma.ritir.ie applications.
The other prong recognizes, of course, the inaiea-
tions 'vy some of the industry that they arc willing to
proceed immediately, using primarily their own funds,
with the construction of nuclear powered merchant ships.
The AEC will be nappy to cooper ;e with the Maritime Ad—
ministration in its efforts to obtain firm fined price
proposals with reasonable guarantees from reactor manu-
facturers acceptable uo prospective shipowners and the
Maritime Administration.
n'e have had discussions with the Under Secretary of
Commerce, lur. Boyd, and representatives of the Maritime
Administration on this approach, and we believe that this
two-pronged approach will result in the most expedient
development of advanced reactor systems that can meet the
broad needs for economic trans-oceanic transportation.
As you know, we are prepared to proceed with a modest
effort now in accordance with the research and development
program plan outlined to the committee previously this
year." 22
The effort was indeed modest, fable VII shows funds
requested and expended by the AEG for merchant ship reac-
tors during the fiscal years following this program state-
ment :
TABLE VII 23,4-0,41,42
APPROPRIATIONS i?0R MERCHANT SHIP REACTORS
_—:— -^TrEs
A r\ r /" 967 1966
~
1969

















*Hot available at this time.
^8,64-3 of the 1967 funds were used to cover cos
associated with shipment of waste fuel from the SAVANNAH
prototype fuel element fabrication and irradiation program.
The remainder of the 1967 funds were used for study and
evaluation of nuclear fuel costs, capital costs, cost
trends and maritime reactor design costs. 2 ^ As noted,
actual expenditures for fiscal years I960 and 1969 are
not yet officially available, but it is the author's un-
derstanding that these funds have not been expended.
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j-Co.j than, three years after Commissioner Harney's des-
cription ci the dual approach to a realistic program I'or
the attainment oi a competitive maritime nuclear pov;er plant,
the Ai)C virtually closed out their interact in merchant snip
nuclear propulsion. George M. Kavanagh, Assistant General
Manager lor Reactors, in a st. .tement before the Senate Sue—
committee en Merchant Marine said:
"As you know neither of these approaches has been
*...->.. " .•...
'a! 5-svQa iRii tt • Shea?©
have been various reasons for this but a sufficient rea-
son has been, the lc.cn of a clear indication that the goal —
an economically self-sufficient snip system in a nuclear
powered merchant fleet - was clearly attainable by either
or oy a combination of both. Developments in the reactor
technology and industry in the last few years have act-
ually tended to mane tne goal less clearly attainable than
appeared likely some years previously
.
;| 6
Considering tne outlay of funds for the merchant ship
reactors program, one wonders how the goal became obscure
in the interval between Commissioner Ramey's testimony and
for . Kavanagh ' s statement
.
in apparent substantiation for the last sentence of
his statement, Mr. Kavanagh explained that the size of
central station nuclear electrical g enerating plants has
been steadily increasing, that they can compete more ef-
fectively in large sizes and that capital costs are less
on a unit cost (8/KW) basis for large plants than for small
plants. He further explained that maritime nuclear power
plants are very small in comparison to those where econom-
ic nuclear electrical power is showing promise, he closed
with tne following statement
:
"Y/ith this situation we are not now seriously promo-
ting the long range development program using a land based
test facility of the type we proposed for use several years
ago. Similarly, the alternate evolutionary process contem-
plated in the bill (S.26i30) before your committee does not
appear to us to have the prospect of leading clearly to the
type and degree of advance which would be needed to make
nuclear propelled ships competitive with conventional ships."
"For the reasons described above we believe that a
broad nuclear merchant ship program should not proceed at
this time and that the Administration posit . i in this re-
gard is a reasonable one."
24
lvlr . Kavanagh was correct in stating that the unit
cost for large reactors is less than small ones; this has
been borne out 'jy capital cost studies of maritime applica—
tions as well as central station power plants. lie was
also correct that reactors contemplated for installation
in even the largest ships v/ould be small in comparison to
xne presently evolving size of central station power reac-
tors. But the conclusion that maritime nuclear power is
uncompetitive ~q~j an analysis of capital cost trends in
central station power plants is somewhat underwhelming and
can hardly be considered a rigorous examination.
A straightforward translation of Mr. Kavanagh ' s final
statement is that since the A^C is not proceeding with the
research and development program outlined by Mr. Kamey, nor
aoes it favor the near-term approach described ~oy Mr. Harney
and supported by proposed legislation, the AEC is not sup-
porting any merchant ship reactors program.
2 . Nuclear Industry
following significant success in the application of
nuclear power to central station electric power plants,
U.S. reactor manufacturers were considerably interested in
the application of atomic energy to commercial marine use.
The interest on the part of nuclear industry is readily
understandable: ten to twenty reactors over a period of
five to ten years plus follow-on support service represents
large profit potential.
3y 1965, the interest was still in evidence, but some
of the vital signs had begun to falter. Testifying before
the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on the development of
the atomic energy industry, Mr. John W. Simpson, Vice Pres-
ident of the i/estinghouse Electric Corporation stated:
"We conclude that a tecnnology to build merchant snip
nuclear propulsion plants is available now. This technology
is a direct spinoff fro;;, the westinghouse commercial cen-
tral station nuclear program, and thus will benefit fro...
future development in that field. As has been the case
for central station nuclear power plants, we are convinced
that the best route to progress and cost reduction in the
nuclear ship field is through the ac bual building and oper-
ating of power plants."
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Mr. Simpson aid not express any illusions about short
tern competition with oil fired ships. In response to a
question from Chairman ..oxiJiuIa regarding the manner in
vvhicn economical propulsion was to be achieved, he said:
"I think it is a question Ox hard work rather tnan
real dramatic breakthrougns because I find it hard to
predict a breakthrough. I don't think the problem is
sufficiently far away from economic reality today that
you would require a major advance. I bhink just hard
work ana ",/xu added volume of doing it many times. <ie
have found in the central station reactors that by just
building tnem ana carrying on the development programs,
the cost has come down very materially." 22
Mr. Simpson was representing that body of opinion
that feels that the best road to competitive merchant
ship nuclear power is not by research and development,
but ~oy volume production of maritime reactors now. This
is the same as the second "near term 11 alternative des-
cribed ~oy Mr. Harney. It is not surprising that this
view would be that of a supplier. The difficulty in ac-
cepting this alternative is that it maximizes public
risk. Volume production of maritime reactors with-
out the benefit of a research and development program
to select the optimum design that would best meet the
unique needs of maritime application represents very sig-
nificant outlays of federal monies without the assurances
oi n 6^ D .
Other vendors were beginning to express dismay at
tne uncertain direction in the maritime reactors program.
In comparing tne west German maritime nuclear program
with our own, Mr. Richard H. Harrison, Vice President of
the Babcock and Wilcox Company was quite direct:
"Unfortunately, the maritime reactors program within
our own country has charted a hesitant and confused course.
In February of 1964, the AEO testified before this commit-
tee that it was terminating tne maritime reactors program
and that very little, if any, government support was req-
uired for tne CKSG (B&V's maritime reactor) before commer-
cial utilization. Actually, ail AhC support for the ChSG-
had been terminated in August 1965, and since that time, we
nave continued on our own in furthering the development of
26
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"we understand ,t ch AEG is now il ing a large-
scale research and developm program based on integral
compact water reactor of v ch our CNSG is the first a:..
foremost type - a type which last year was refused support
because it was then considers .. the AEG to be noncompe-
titive wi ;ii . alternate nonwater concept. Assuredly,
BccW cannot compete -with the Government in developing this
reactor, and we must reassess our own program when t he
character and scope of the reoriented AEG plan are made
Let In the final gmalysio, if development of a com-
mercial design is to be successful, the AEC and industry
must reestablish a common basis for cooperation in keep-
v/ith the spirit and intent of the Atomic Energy Act of
1954." 22
In an effort to take the present pulse of the nuclear
industry v/ith respect to interest in maritime reactors,
trie author addressed a letter of inquiry to the five lead-
ers in that field. Three of the five did not reply. The
reply of Combustion Engineering said:
"while Combustion Engineering maintains interest in
commercial nuclear snip propulsion, we co not presently
have a nuclear steam supply system for merchant ship ap-
plication in our product line. Development of our UITIMOD
reactor, with which you are familiar, was discontinued
about four years ago because of lack of commercial inter-
est in the application. I might point out that the reac-
tor for the German ore carrier 'OTTO HAHIi" now undergoing
testing employs the 'self pressurized' concept first in-
troduced by Combustion." 26
Personal correspondence with individuals in the in-
dustry brought similar replies:
•'I am most interested oy your study. You should know,
however, that ail work terminated in mid 1965. I believe
it was not too long after that, that ,the other companies
who had been pursuing this maritime program also termina-
ted or severely cut back their efforts. I know of no work
currently in this area other than your study.
Ano ther reply:
"Because of the lack of a clear-cut maritime nuclear
propulsion policy in Washington, the Company's nuclear
merchant snip group here was dissolved a year or so ago
and the personnel assignee to other tasks. Unfortunately,
no one is available to provide specific answers to the
questions raised ~oy your letter."
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Interest in the merchant chip reactors program on
the part of the nuclear industry is clearly hibernated*
The close coupling between industry's disinvestment of
interest and the actions of the Atomic Energy Commission
can hardly ^o unnoticed.
5 . shipowners
In May 1966, the Maritime Administration addressed
a letter oi inquiry to 56 shipping companies to determine
shipowner interest in merchant ship nuclear power.
Nine percent, representing 15$ of the polled comp-
anies' ships, indicated definite interest in near-term
nuclear ships. Forty-five percent of the companies, own-
ing 61$ of the ships, were interested only if favorable
economies could be proven. Forty-six percent, owning
25$ of the ships were either not interested or did not
on
reply. '
Testifying in support of Title X of the proposed
amendment to the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 before the
House Subcommittee on Merchant Marine in 1965, Admiral
John M. Will, U.S. Navy (retired), Chairman of the Board
of the American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Incorporated
(AEIL), made the following statement:
"Continued operation of NS SAVANNAH further convinced
us not only of the feasibility of nuclear merchant ship
operation, but that in the not too distant future such
ships would have a rightful place in our merchant marine
merely from the standpoint of 'economics.
Accordingly, in January 1966 we made a specific and
detailed proposal to the Maritime Administration for the
construction of three high-speed nuclear container ships
for sailing on Trade Route 12."
"In the latter half of last year, as a result of price
escalations announced "oy the industry, we did some work to
update our construction proposal, and to review the econom-
ics of tne matter. Cur initial proposal was
'
predicated on
the belief that the three large, high-speed ships were going
to be economically competitive with similar fossil-fuel
fired ships.
Our position today is essentially unchanged from the
standpoint of enthusiasm. V.'e believe the potential is there
but the road now appears to be a bit longer than we though
Admittedly, in light of sost situation existing
today, we as a private operate . cannot assume the total
burden of a nuclear ship program. However, if some con-
siderations are given to details of the added costs of con-
struction and operation, including those related to fuel
2 p
cli. .rge: , v,; e are both willing ana nuch interested, as we
have stated before, in undertaking . Lch a program."
"In s - iry, I feel ^a; SAVAhT:AH experience points
only to success in the use of :.uci.ear power in a merchant
vessel. 1 believe that the economics for high-speed runs
are loaded in favor of nuclear. I believe the time to
build additional nuclear merchant snips is now." 5
She proposal referred to by Admiral Will involves
the construction of three 70,000 SHP nuclear powered con-
tainer snips on routes between tne united orates ana tne
peeds of 50 knots, Total cost for the threec- -,-.
ships ranges from $102 to 0152 million dollars. A2IL
agreed to provide seme $50 million of the total construc-
tion cost of the three ships. 10 The Maritime Administra-
tion is unable to act on the proposal even if the funds
were available for the purpose, since the Merchant Marine
Act of 1956 limits the amount of construction differential
subsidy to 55/'« for ships of the type proposed.
Since AEIL is the only shipowner in the United States
with experience in the operation of nuclear powered mer-
chant ships by virtue of their agency for the government
in the operation of SAVANNAH, they probably represent the
most progressive point of view among shipowners towards
nu c 1 ear p w er
.
The American Merchant Marine, propped as it is through
the system of direct and indirect subsidies and struggling
for survival in world competition, is in no position to
underwrite the cost of merchant ship nuclear power.
C . Summary
It can be stated with little equivocation that the
state of merchant ship nuclear power is represented ~oy




IKE ECONOMIC FEASIBILITY Oi1 MEHCI-IANT SHIP NUCLEAR PO'vVSH
... Preface
Having completed the tasks of reviewing the origins
and effect of present day maritime law, the state of the
United States Merchant Marine and the positions of those
forces that control merchant ship nuclear potential, this
study will now present its dominant purpose: the economic
feasibility of nuclear propulsion for commercial marine
application.
3. Concent
As in most feasibility studies, this paper will ex-
amine two alternatives: the conventional oil fueled ship
as the defender and the nuclear powered ship as the chal-
lenger. These competing alternatives will he compared ir
a realistic manner. The "basic concept of this comparison
is that the best index of engineering success is profit-
ability and the only meaningful measure of profit is the
after-tax return on investment. Although there has been
a serious effort to reflect actual costs in 1970 dollars,
no claim can be made for cost precision. The dominant
purpose of the study is to compare the relative profit-
ability of the two alternatives; therefore; as long as
correct relative costs are presented, the results will be
qualitatively correct if not quantitatively precise.
Secondly, the reader will not find in this study
the phrase too often contained in similar comparisons:
ur2he nuclear powered alternative is cost competitive at
speeds of knots and above." Such statements have
little meaning if the shipowner can build a slower ship
that offers cheaper transportation. In short, the defen-
der will be met on its own ground.
C . Approach
llhe construction of a mathematical model of a hypo-
thetical, yet realistically cor 'igured contemporary mer-
chant ship will be .described. All cost factors related
tc the construction ana operation ci one snip are contain-
ed in the model. The model is then "put to sea" in both
a conventional and nuclear configuration under iaentical
conditions and the results of operations are economically
compared. All model operations are accomplished through
the medium of an IBM 360 model 50 computer.
The study comp: s nuclear and fossil fuel power by
assessing the relative costs and profitabilities without
government support or subsidy. In the opinion of the au-
thor, these would only serve to clutter the search for
true economic viability. As a practical matter, the type
ship under study is not eligible for either the construc-
tion or operating differential subsidy.
D • Shio Description
She ship under study is a bulk-cargo, representative
of ore carriers, grain ships, etc. and is designed for a
round trip sailing of 24-, 000 nautical miles. The ship is
assumed to sail with full cargo deadweight in one direct-
ion and return in ballast. The cargo discharge point is
east coast United Stages. The ship is pari: of a captive
fleet, corporation owned and equity 'financed. Owners re-
quire a return on investment of 10$ after taxes of 4-8$.
Ship life is assumed to be 25 years.
A bulk-cargo was selected for this study for the fol-
lowing reasons:
1 • In terms of tonnage, 72$ of our dry-cargo trade is
bulk, while only 28$ is liner. 9
2. Serious literature on comparative ship economics recog-
nizes the bulk-cargo type as having the greatest pot-
1 2 28 2Q
ential for nuclear power application. ' * ' r
3. It is easier for the reader to see how the fuel weight
saving potential of nuclear power is exploited as com-
pared to other type ships. In the bulk-cargo, the space
normally occupied by oil fuel is converted directly to
increased cargo in the nuclear alternative.
The technical characteristics of the ship under study














J -- i . ' - ——— - --—--—--- - ,. - ---
|
r -t>, -.
Length between perpendiculars (l) 755.0 feet
Limiting operating draft 54-. feet
Design draft 57.5 feet
Depth (D) 52.5 feet
Beam (2) 95.75 feet
Block coefficient ax design draft 0.80
Beam-draft ratio ax design draft 2.5
Length-draft raxio at design dra^'j 19.6
Length-depth ratio 14.0
Displacement at design draft 59,100 long tons
Displacement at operating draft 55,500 long tons
machinery Single screw,
steam turbine
ahai o horsepower To oe optimized
Speed
, To be optimized





Construction of the no del is described in five sections:
Construction Costs, Annual Operating ^osis, Annual Trans-
port Capacity, Capital Recovery factor and Measure of Merit.
Cost levels are appropriate only ior a single ship acqui-
sition in United States shipyards.
1. Construction Cost
Construction costs consist of null structure, out-
fitting and hull engineering, machinery, miscellaneous
and design. The basic approach will be to show the com-
putational method for material and labor associated with




Hull structure includes the main null structure, su-
perstructure, deck houses, all internal divisional bulk-
heads, masts, kingposts ana foundations. The hull struc-
ture is assumed to contain only a noi al amount of spec-
ial steels and aluminum alloys. One long ton (LT) = 224-0
pounds. Structure cost is computed as follows:
material ~ (&220/LT) * structure weight (LT)
labor = (61.5 man-hour s/LT ) * structure weight (LT)
Structure weight = 0.32 ->.-. cubic number
where: 0.32 = the structure steel weight
coefficient
cubic number = (L*B*D)/100
Structure weight of the nuclear ship is increased ~oy
30100 tons to provide for a collision barrier. The col-
lision barrier serves to absorb the deformation strain
in the reactor area in the event of collision in orcer





Outfitting ana "mil Ihvrineerin::
Outiittings coc"u o incluae hull insulation, joiner
bulkheads, hawse pipes, deck fittings, cargo boons, anchors,
rudaer and stock, galley equipment and hatch covers. lull
engineering consists of non-propulsion mechanical equip-
ment such as deck machinery, steering engine, generators,
ventilation and air conditioning systems, refrigeration
ants | hull pipijn
;
pui • i fid ©Isotrioal systems*
The ship is assumed to be non-self-loading and equipped
with mechanical hatch covers. Costs are computed as follows:
Material = (31 , 575/LT) * 0&HI3 weight (LT)
labor = (260 man-hours/LT) *• O&HE weight (IT)
0&H3 weight = 0.05 2 -x- Cubic number
where 0.032 = the O&HS weight coefficient
c Machinery
Machinery costs include all propulsion equipments,
fittings, piping systems, instruments and controls from
screw to stack. It is a critical element in this study
and will be approached accordingly. Assumptions are as
follows:
(1) The Nuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS) incorporates
an air-cooled reactor such as described in references
20 and 30.
(2) Development cost for the 1,'SSS has already been absorbed.
24Tms is a lact lor several maritime reactor systems
including the air-cooled reactor (ACS.) described in
reference 20 - the General Electric 63GA.
(3) Total machinery cost is reduced by 9 c/o for machinery
arrangement aft as in this case.
(4) The engineering plant is non-automated.
r2he total installed cost of the conventional mach-
inery plant, including profit and overhead is estimated
as foXxows:
r> c
Cost = 0.91 * S647v°00 * (ShP/'iOOO) 0,0
where 0.9 1 = machinery aft reduction
SrIP = shaft horsepower
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i'he total installed cost of the nuclear machinery
plant, including profit ana overhead but exclusive of the
cost of the hSSS is estimated as follows:
Cost = 0.91 * o635 5 000 * (Sh?/lGGG)
u * b
The cost of the ACH Nuclear Steam Supply System is
estimated as follows:
mQ9 Oc - v92^ v OOO « ( SHE/ l 000 ) ° '
The capital cost attributed to the G-eneral Electric
Vcdei 650a AC?, for units aiter a market had been establ-
30
ished was estimated to be o'l ,900, 000.00 in 1965. In an
attempt to arrive at first-cost estimate ana maxe appro-
riate allowance for the substantial increases in NSSS
costs in recent years, the HSSS cost formula above rep-






Miscellaneous hardware costs include such elements
as engineering, staging, cleaning, launching, temporary
lights, trial expenses, material handling and so forth.
These costs are estimated in the model 'oy increasing the
sum of all material costs by 5$ and labor 'oy 1 55»
Miscellaneous software costs that must be added to
the construction bill are administration and technical
services, plan approval, inspection, legal fees, consul-
ting fees, naval architects'- fees, transportation and
communications. Software costs are estimated as follows:
Cost = 0550,000 -- 0.015 * Total Construction Cost
e Desi .-T-
The shipbuilder's design charges are expressed as a
percentage of the total of structure cost, outfitting and
hull engineering, machinery and miscellaneous hardware.
?or the conventional ship, this is estimated to be approx-
imately 4 l/a. ?or the nuclear ship, the estimate is 9'fi, l A
significant contribution to the difference is the inclu-
sion of a very conservative figure for the shipbuilder's
35
reactor plant urso-time design ana engineering charges
This cost could vary significantly depending on whether
the shipbuilder had prior nuclear ship construction ex-
perience ana facilities. J
• Overhead- uabo r Rate, Profit and Inflation factors
She model applies overhead, labor rate, profit and
an adjustment lor cost; miration to eacn 01 tne construc-
tion costs centers. Overhead has been approximated as a
percentage of direct labor. This percentage will vary
widely among shipyards and is dependent on such factors
as shipbuilding volume and economic climate. A figure of
70/j has been incorporated into the model. Profit is ex-
pressed as a percentage mark-up on the total of material,
labor ana overhead and is set at 5> in the model. The
average labor rate, representing the full range of skil-
led ana unsxilied labor needea to bulla the ship is taken
as S3. 50 per hour, finally, to each of the construction
costs has been adued an appropriate inflation factor in
order to arrive at 1970 dollars.
These factors are at best rough approximations, but
so long as they are applied equally to both the convent-
ional and nuclear alternatives, the qualitative results
will not be effected.
2. Annual Operating Goousts
Annual Operating Costs include wages, Subsistance,
Maintenance and Repair, Stores and Supplies, Insurance,
Overhead and Miscellaneous, Port Expenses, Puel Costs
and Depreciation. There is a great variety of approaches
to the subject of operating costs and each is only educa-
ted approximation. There is no particular virtue claimed
for the methods used in this study, except that the results
seem to agree fairly well with others.
a • w age s
Wages include the pay of officers and crew including
regular wages, overtime, vacation pay, emergency allow-
ances and bonuses. Contributions to welfare and oension
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ns as .veil as unemployment compensation and similar
social security taxes would also ce included unaer tnis
heading. ^This cost is directly dependent on the number of
personnel in the chip's complement. It is assumed that
the nuclear ship will require no more personnel than the
conventional alternative. Total complement is calculated
as follows:
Complement - 1.25( 13(CN/lOOO) 1 /6+ 1 2(SH?/1000) 1 ' 5 -12 )
where: 1.25 = coefficient for stewards
13 = coefficient for deck
GIT = cubic number
12 = coefficient for engineering
lj. aThe number 12 is subtracted from the total since thi
formula is applicable to cargo-liners and bulk carriers have
a complement of about a dozen less.
It is assumed that the average wage for the convention-
al snip is $15 » 000 per man per year. For the nuclear ship,
it is assumed that these wages will be increased by 10$ due
to the increased level of skills and education required for .
29 31personnel m the engineering ana command structure. ^ ''
b . Sub si stance
Subsistance includes all edibles for consumption by
the ship's complement and board and room allowances in
lieu of suosi stance ana loaging aooard ship. Annual sub-
sistance cost is computed by multiplying the complement
'oy &770. This figure is the same for both nuclear and
conventional crews; nuclear personnel are better paid,
not necessarily better fed.
c » y.aintenance and Re'oair
Maintenance and Repair includes a wide range of charges
including cleaning, painting., scraping, inspection, cost
of preventive maintenance to ship ec ipments, repairs and
spare parts. M&R costs are hardly susceptible to definit-
ization; trade route weather, owner's standards and other
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factors create wide variation, This cost is estimated as
iOo._g'.. s
;
J.l&R - S10,000(CI\T/l000) 2/5 + s,4,50G(s:iP/';G00) 2/^ + £4-0,000
.me urst lactor m "•' itmn v^pc-,^
cost oi maintenance and repairs to the hull, the second fac-
tor is machinery Ivl&H and the s^ 4-0 3 000 is a correction for
bulk carriers.
There is a credible argument for lower nuclear IvI&R
costs because of the superior reliability of equipment
20
der.iana.ee. by A20 licensing standards. There is an equally
creditable argument that although nuclear repairs are less
frequent, they are more costly when needed. In the absence
of experience , they are placed equal in the model. °» ^ ' **
d . Stores and Supplies
Stores and Supplies include ail consumables and ex-
pendible equipment such as tools , utensils, paint, clean-
ing materials, lubricating oil and so forth. Host of these
are associated with crew-performed maintenance; therefore,
the annual cost of stores and supplies is a function of
erew c omp1 ernent
:
Cost = 8 80 ( complement/1 0)
This cost is considered to be equal for the two al-
t erna t iv e s
.
e . In Uj. d-liU c
The annual cost of insurance includes coverage for
Protection and Indemnity, Hull and Machinery and war-Risk,
Protection and Indemnity (P&l) protects the shipowner against
liability lawsuits. This study assumes that such action
would be the result of crew action and therefore is a
function of complement:
P&I Cost = $965 (complement)
P&I rates are set 50$ higher for the nuclear ship than
the conventional. Trie potential release of fission products
to the atmosphere and resultant biological damage is the
basis for this assumption.
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Hull and Machinery (H&iv;) insurance provides protection
against damages to or the lose of the ship and is a function
oi the owner's past record. An average cost is assumed in
the model:
H&M Cost = $?"I0, 000 + 0.007 (construction cost)
War-risk insurance is estimated to be 0.1 percent oi'





Overhead and Ivliscelieous (O&M) costs include fleet
management expenses, communication, crew transportation,
survey fees, hills of health., fresh water and so forth.
This cost; is the same for both alternatives and is est-
imated on the basis of vessel displacement:
O&M Cost; = ^50,000 + $1 2(displacement/l000)
g Port Ixosnse s
Port expenses include such costs as pilotage, customs
fees, tonnage taxes, tug services, line handlers and so
forth. Since a specific trade route has not; 'oeen spec-
ified for this study other than a round trip distance of
24,000 miles, this cost can only be generalized on the
basis of displacement:
Port Costs = ($1,000 + $80( displacement/1 000) ) * RT
where: RT = the number of round trips
per year
The computation for RT will be described in Section
3: Transport Capacity.
As was the case for maintenance and repair, there are
conflicting viewpoints on whether port charges would be
the same for both alternatives. The nuclear ship will ex-
perience costs that are unique to the nuclear technology:
health physics support and radioactive waste disposal. On
the other hand, the nuclear ship will not bear the constant
costs associated with port refueling which are not insig-
nificant on an annual basis. Por these offsetting reasons,
V
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no charges are inclu^su. in the nooei for the unique port
charges oi the nuclear ship nor are any included for bunk«
ering fees or ou. oarging lor trie conventional.
It should be noted that no canal passage has been
nor in tnis section nor m tne section on trans-
port capacity. This is mostly ior the convenience oi the
author but the now existing conditions in the middle east
provide a convenient rationale.
h. Depreciation
lion-subsidized ships are permitted to use any reason-
able method of depreciation as long as it is consistently
applied. Ine methods generally used are straight-line,
esciining balance and sum of the years-digits, For sub-
sidized vessels.; any of these three methods are acceptable
for income tax purposes, but for the purpose of subsidy
accounting, owners must depreciate on the straight-line
basis
.
The model depreciation is on a straight-line basis
and assumes no sal"."age value at the end of ship life:
Depreciation Cost = construction cost/25
i. Fuel
Computation of fuel costs are complex and critical
to the purposes of this study. Accordingly, they shall
be described in some detail.
( 1 ) C onv ent i ona1 Ship
To find total annual fuel cost, the following equation
must be solved:
Annual fuel cost =
barrels/sea day * $/barrel * sea days/HT * RT/year = $/year
Each of the factors of this equation shall be described
in turn. The conventional bulk-cargo ship is assumed to burn
bunker "c" oil at the following rate:
Barrels per sea day = 5C + 54.2(SH?/1000)
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lor reasons that will ^ explained in the ..ecTion on
transport capacity, the conventional ship is assumed to
take on bunkers at the point oi car^o eisckarge - east
coast U.S. ihrough The courtesy of the United States Coast
Guard, the author obtained the cost of bunker "c" at each
of five major ports' on the eastern seaboard. . :.s of 13
January 1 9 o 9 > the average price oi* oil fuel at these ports
was &2i15 PS2? barrel 5 exclusive of barging costs*.
2he Tnird factor in the eouaTion, sea days per round
Trip , is calculated as xollowsi
( nautical milcs/l; 1 . )
(24 hours/sea day") * (speed in nautical mi-.es/nour)
(24-000)/(24vcspeed)
The computation for speed will be described in the
section on transport capacity, as will The final facTor
in the equation, round trips per year.
Collecting all factors, the total annual fuel cost for
The conventional ship can be expressed:
Cost = (50+34. 2*(SHP/1 000) )*( 2.1 5)*( 24 000/(24-*speed) )*R!
( 2 ) Uuclear Shi'o
Before formulating the equation for nuclear fuel cost
used in the model, some background is necessary to under-
stand the basic dependences of - nuclear fuel cost and the
variables involved. Nuclear fuel cost can be thought of
as consisting of the following factors:
(a) Cost of Preparing Uranium
Ihe cost of uranium preparation for installation in
one reaccor core includes tne costs of natural uranium,
conversion to JPg, enrichment in. U , conversion of enriched
UPg into UOg and The fabrication of The U0 p into fuel ele-
ments .
(b) Cost of Pissicnable material
'ine net cost of the fissionable material burned in
the core is based on The reduction in 'J 2 -5 ' _.ss credit ob-
tained from the production of plutoniuia.
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{c) Uosx 01 Recovering Residual li'uel Value
The cost Oi recovering biie residual value of uranium
and piutonium remaining in the spent core included the cost
oi" shipping the spent fuel and the chemical processing nec-
essary to restore the fuel to marketable form.
(d) Interest on i/ork:ing Capital
Each step in the fuel cycle, whether before, during
or after irradiation of the fuel in the reactor represents
a requirement for working capital, fhe cost; of the work-
ing capital is the interest expense on these funds.
The importance of interest rate to the competitive
position of the nuclear ship cannot be overemphasized.
The dependency of interest rate ana the cost of fuel is
approximately 0.1 mills/SHPHR for every Vjo change in the
interest rate. At the present time, a changeover from
government to private ownersnip of nuclear fuel is in pro-
cess. Prior to this change, the AEC had charged an inter-
est rate or ''use charge" of 5*5> per year on the cost of
the reactor fuel load, if private ownerships adjusts this
rate, the cost of nuclear fuel will change accordingly.
Utilisation, or the rate at which the fuel is used
in the ship, is second only to interest rate in importance
to the economics of nuclear fuel. The less time the ship
is at sea, the longer it will take to expend the fuel. ±he
longer the fuel is on board, the higher the interest expense
will be. Part IV of this study will demonstrate graphi-
cally the importance of this concept.
Nuclear fuel costs are expected to decrease with time
through improvements in technology such as improved fuel
burnup properties, reduction in the the costs of enrich-
ment and the economies of volume in the fuel cycle pro-
cesses. It is important to understand that the vol'
economy will depend to a considerable extent on the degree
of similarity between maritime reactor fuel design and
the present majority user of m bear energy, the central
station power plant. Tae greater the similarity, the grea-
ter the economy in fabrication and reprocessing.
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[ icle, • .' el rates incorpor ; i into the model
arc a linear adaptation of the raxes cixco. ior the General
Electric 650A L-Iarx IV, a nuclear fueled steam generator-
superheater uesignec. for merhcant ship application. Infor-
mation on the 630A is taken from reference 20 ana cited
herein with the kind permission of Mr. E.3. Delson of
General Electric who co-authored the reference with ilr.
E*C. Hunt. --. portion of the fuel col/;, curves '.vhich ap-
pear in the reference are shown in Figure 1
.
The assumptions appearing in the reference in sup-
port of these raxes are as follows:
1. The price of natural uranium will be 05 per pound oy
2. The presently established price for enrichment will
continue tnrcugh 1971 j ^iien with toll enrichment ana
private ownership of fuel, will be gradually reduced
to 70/^ of present cost q~j '974. ( Toll enrichment is
an AEG service which provides for the enrichment of
privately owned uranium for a fee based en xhe amount
of separative work required. The ^ervice is scheduled
to begin in 1969 and was authorized under the Private
Ownership of Special Nuclear Materials Act of 1964.
It is expected to be extensively used in the produc-
tion of enriched fuel for nuclear reactors. jUr )
5. The cost or reprocessing and turnabout will be ^24,000
per day from 1970 to 1972, then reduce to about 518,000
per day ~'oy about 1977 and then hold constant. ( Turn-
about is the process in which the reprocessing facil-
ity is cleaned and prepared for the reprocessing of
other types of fuel. This relates to the previous
comment that nuclear fuel economy will 2 dependent
on similarity of fuel with ether types. )
4-. The use charge will remain steady at 5.5 $ fro::. 1971 en
To the extent that these conditions do not obtain at




... ;ter of interest, while the 1965 quoted price
for the production model 650A .vas si ; ficantly lov;er Than
comparable pressurized water reactor concepts for maritime
propulsi n, The 630A nuclear fuel coots were ..i.jAor. It
is also interesting to noTe that while the highest fuel
rate that appears ir. figure 1 is about 2 55 mills/SHPHR,
The oil fuel price of &2.15 assumed in The model equates
to about 5.5 mills/SHPHR. The significance of This dif-
ference to the competitive position of the two alterna-
tives will be more appar^nT in part IV of The study.
,/ith some background for the fund am tal elemenTs
of nuclear fuel cost established, The specific formula
for annual nuclear fuel cost used in Tne mouel can now
be set forth:
Annual Fuel Cost =
Rate * SHP * hours/seaday * seadays/AT * RT/year * $/mill
= $/year
where: Rate = mills/SHPHR
or.
Cost = Rate * 24 * 24000/(24 * speed) * RT/lOOO
simplifying:
Annual Fuel Cost - Rate * SHP -* 24/speed * RT
3 . Annual Transport Ca'oaci ."•
The annual transport capacity is defined as The num-
ber of long Tons of cargo carried per year and is of course
the source of revenue. The annual Transport capacity is
obTained by multiplying The long tons of cargo carried
per rounu Trip by Tne number of round Trips per year (RT).
Round Trips per year is calculated as follows:
RT = (365 days/year * U)/( seadays/RT + portdays/AT)





Utilization (U) is the percentage of days in a 565
day year during which the ship is either at sea in transit
between the cargo loacing ana discharge ports, or is in
these ports for the
_
pose oi loading or discharging car-
go, fhe difference between 565 cays and the number of days
involved in this activity is the number of days that the
ship - - in a repair and upkeep z^uzuz or is idle because
of a lack of cargo charter.
b
.
S eadays r^er Round 'frit'
Seadays per round trip is the in transit status de-
fined above and is computed as follows:
Seadays 2 = round trip ais~ nce/( 24- * speed)
c Soee d
Speed is extracted from an approximation of the fol-
lowing conventional formula:
EH? = (V/35G;(-chiY 2G_)
where: EH? = effective horsepower
V = velocity,, ft/sec
d = density of water, slugs/:
A = total wetted surface, ft
C. = total resistance coefficient
This formula is corrected for appendages to the hull
such as bilge keels, then divided by the propulsive co-
efficient appropriate to the characteristics of the ship
under study to yield Sri?. In the model, SliP is the en-
tering argument and velocity is solved for in nautical
miles per hour.
d. ?ortdays "oer i-'ound Tri'o
Portdays per round trip is as defined above under
utilization and is estimated as follows:
?ortdays/Rr = cargo deadweight/22000 -,- 2
?or the purposes of this study, an average figure




Having calculated round trips per year, it remains to
compute cargo carried per round trip in order to multiply
the two to obtain annual transport capacity. The snip's
cargo capacity is ootained as follows:
DIS3 LACj-iiVliili^l
•











= C JIGrO CAPACITY
lach of these factors will now be defined and for-




Displacement is the //eight of the volume of water
displaced ''oy the floating ship ana has been established
in Table VIII as 5^,500 long "tons,
f. Lightship
The lightship condition is the sum of the weights of
structure , outfit, hull engineering ana machinery. The
first three of these have been formulated in the section
on construction costs. Machinery weight is estimated as
follows:
i
Machinery weight = 2'. 4( Shi?/ 1 000)*
Although nuclear machinery plants may someday be
equal to or less in weight than the .conventional plant,
such is not the case today. In the model, the nuclear
machinery plant is estimated to weight 5 CJ> more than the
c onv ent i onal . °
'
g Deadweight
As defined in the formula above, deadweight is the
difference between displacement ana tne weight of the
fixed structures of the ship. It is the weight of the
volume of the ship remaining for cargo, fuel and misc-
ellaneous consumables necessary to operate the ship.
:h . " ' i ( : ] ' G I. ' " t
jruelweight is a critical dcii.r.i; 02* this analysis.
For bhe conventional ship, the amount and therefore weight
of fuel required is a 'unction of voyage distance and ship
speed. The greater the amount of fuel required,, the less
volume remains for revenue-producing cargo . Nuclear fuel
weight is independent of both speed and distance and varies
only with the power rating of the reactor. HueLear fuel
weight is therefore a constant ana its insignificant weight
is combined with the weight of the nuclear machinery plant
as part of lightship weight. Since the cargo capacity in
the nuclear ship is not docreasca by additional fud oil
requirements, it has a significant advantage over the
conventional, particularly where long trace routes and
high speeds are concerned. As will be seen in part IV,
this and fuel cost are two important advantages in nuc-
lear ship economics
lor the conventional ship, luelweight is calculated
as follows:









1,15 = a safety margin allowance of 15$
0*5 = half bunkers J in order to reduce the effect
of fuel deadweight on cargo capacity, the
ship is assumed to take on bunkers at the
cargo discharge pore
6.62 = the number of barrels per long ton
Additional economies might be achieved for the con-
ventional ship by taking on half bunkers at both ends of
the voyage if the price of bunker "c" is cheaper at the
loading port than it is on the east coast of the U.S.
Nuclear fuel weight is combined w: nucb sar machinery
plant weight as explained above and for the ship under study,
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would be negli, ible at something lose than 200 kilograms
( 44-0 pounds )
.
i. Mi so ellrinco '..:.•
Kiiscelianeous deadweigl c includes suen items as lub-
ricating oil, crew, crew effects, provisions, stores, feed
and uo::e;"hc wa.ter.' This weight is small and is generally
under 300 tons. In the model, miscellaneous deadweight is
assumed to increase by 2 tons per thousand SUP increase*
The cargo capacity per round trip thus arrived ax
can now be multiplied by the number of round trips per
year to obtain cargo capacity per year or annual transport
capacity
.
4 • Os-'oital Recovery Pac _sr
Capital Recovery Factor (CRp) is t; at percentage of
the total construction cos"u of the ship that must be re-
turned annually to the owners to pay c_ ;ing costs and
taxes, and still provide a yield of 10>» after taxes. Cap-
ital recovery factor is defined as follows:
CRP (before taxes) = A/p
where: A = annual return or revenue less operating
costs before taxes
P = total construction cost
OR?' (after taxes) = A'/P
where: A : = annual rexurx after tax
CRP' is developed as follows:
A" = A —t(A — P/N), where t = tax rate and N = ship life
and P/h = depreciation.
or:
A s = A — tA -r tP/A
so
:
= A { I — o j -r tP/_,
Dividing both sides by P:




ORE' - 0RE(1 - t) + t/N
inverting:
CHi1 = ORE' - .
i
— u
Since the assumptions for the model are a tax rate of
48>j, ship life of 25 years and afxer xax yield of 10$:
ORE = . 1102 - C. 43/ 25 = 0.1750
1 - 0.4-3
•^Obtained from Capital Recovery fables for 10$ yield
and 25 periods.
A graphic presentation of the division of revenues
is shovvn in Eigure 2:
depreciation = P/N taxable income = A - p/N
<__ ><:
n 3 1 inc om e =
-P/N-tU-P/N
!•<- rH
R. -i^V £il\l U.&
->,«^
operating a 2 = return aixer xax*D = A-t(A-l/l) income xax =
cosbsl a. / A t> At ^
L* >
A = return oeiore xax
FIGURE 2: DIVISION 01 REVENUE
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Having established the procedures for computing con-
struction cc6te, annual operating coo^ij annu L tr; >rt
capacity and capital recovery factor, the last ana most im-
portant task is to describe the .. y .vhich the de-
fender and challenger are "30 be compared economically.
Since we have not specified what cargo is to be carried
or at what port it is to be loaded, the revenues are un-
known. Furthermore, these revenues will vary between the
two alternatives because of difference in the annual trans-
tort capacity., An appropriate; measure of merit under
these circumstances is the Required Preight hate (R?R).
rfhis is the cost in dollars per long ton that the owner
must charge the customer in order to achieve the spec-
ified rate of return. Required freight rate is defined
as follows:
'AYR = annual oteratirm c o s t -;- c at i t al recovery cost
annual transport capacity
This measure is simple and effective. alternative
offering tne lowest R3?i{ is the better economic venture.
This completes the description of the model. A copy
of the computer program constructed to accomplish tne com-
putations described is included as Appendix 3. Appendix
C is an example of the computer results of operations.
51
irArt j. ± v
k >ULT3 bi OPIL-vaTIOK
O
_L o. L. ^
This part presents tne results of operating the model
described in Part III over a snip utilization range of 70
to 95$ ana a power range of 5,000 to 50,000 shaft horse-
power. Bulk-cargo ships are expected to be operational
about 54-0-545 days per year. This norm is represented by
a ship utilization of 95^-
n one tract ion cost
ane construction cost oi tne two alternatives is pre-
sented in figure 5. The ccet of tne nuclear ship is sig-
nificantly higner tnan the conventional over the full
range of power investigatea. Construction cost in inde—
pendent of utilization. (The shipbuilder aocsn't care
wnetner tne owners use tne snip or not as long as tne
builacr is paid*) Tne construction coet of the unclear
eaip is uigner tnan tne conventional
1 ow i n.g lactors
.
o e c au s e o
i
lol-
I . btructure cost
Nuclear structure cost is higner because of the nec-
essity to include a collision barrier.
2. Machinery Gc 3
Nuclear machinery cost is far and away tne most sig-
nificant reason for the difference in construction costs.
The intrinsic expense associated with the sophistication,
required reliability and mandatory safety factors of nuc-
clear technology causes tne cost of the nuclear machinery
plant to be virtually double that of the conventional oil
fired boiler machinery plant.
5 . iscellaneous Co s -1
Miscellaneous costs are nigner for ruciear ship
•
since tney are expressed as a percentag of the materials




4 . Dea :: . C :
Design cost is higher since it is a percentage of the
total construction cost and includes the shipbuilder v s first
tine costs for installation of the nuclear machinery plant.
A breakdown of construction costs for the two ships
is presented in Table IX below. Like sub guent tables in
this part, the information is extracted from that part of
the computer run-out representing a ship utilization of 95$
and a power of 14000 SKP. As will be seen in the section




Jcnventi:- :-- "., r
Structure 87,763,572 87,830,637
Outfit & Hull Engineering . 6,91 2
:
S74 6,912,674





^ ° Annual Operating Cost s
Comparative anna," operating costs are presented in
figure 4. ihis cost is higher for the nuclear ship except
at extremely high powers beyond economic consideration. The
causes for the higher nuclear cost are wages, insurance and
depreciation* The single cost advantage of the nuclear ship
in the operating t catagory is fuel* As power is incre-
sed, the cost of oil fuel outruns the nuclear costs. This
accounts for the convergence and eventual cross-over of the
two curves. Comparative annual fuel cc^ts are presented in
Pigure 5.
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a breakdown of annual o jr .ting costs for the two










liidiiwanance & Repai '1 7 066 177,
'
Stores & Supplies 3,507 3,507
Total Insurance 217,: 269,517
Overhead & Miscellaneous 5C,o4-2 _ .,04-2








-' Annual P'rar.sT)ort Capacity
Comparative annual transport capacities are presented
in figure 6 and show a decided advantage for the nuclear
alternative. Per reasons explained in Part IIP. the cargo
capacity of the nuclear ship is unaffected by fuel weight
considerations; conseque;
.y, as power is increased the
caro'0 advantage of the nuclear ship increases dramatically
It is interesting to note that at power ratings in excess
of 5 20C0 SEP, the amount of oil fuel the conventional
ship is required to carry is so great that annual trans-
port capacity actually declines. Phis has very important
connotations with respect to the characteristics of the


















Table XI is a su try of the annual transport capuc-
ity characteristics of trie owo snips.
ANNUAL TRANSPORT CAPACITY CHARACTERISTICS
Conventional oar
r( liiXvjr II J. ' Ui'.u.-ij-.xi.X
Displacement ;>3 , 500 53 , 500
Structure . 11, 576 1 1 , 676
Seadays per Year
Portdays per rear








Outfit a Hull Engineerir ',•• 1,88'
Machinery 800 840
Light Shio 14,257 14-, 397
Deadweight 39 5 245 .^ ;0;
Fuel Weight 2,992
Kiscella ous iY eight 250 250




Hound Trips per Year »
Annual Transport Capacity
-
E» Annua C a -oi~:aL Recovery Pactc r
Comparative annual capital recovery factors are shown
in Piaure 7. nee the CRP is a fixed percentage of the
total construction cost, the nuclear capital recovery is
significantly higher than the conventional.




___.:_ 'e ox Meri t
oforc presentation oi" the measure of rneri ; , nalysis,
uatement of clarification an pur iose is ne - 1 lest
the knowledgeable comm misint ret ;he r< ;ults. 1'he
author is painfully av/are that the required freight rates
set forth in tnis section of the analysis are not bypical
of commercial raxes available on the world mar ; for bulk
goes. ri\hat thej ar not :al is a reflection on trie
pathetic competitive state of the United otates merchant
marine and do not invali . ; the findings of this study on
that ground. it must be borne in mind ;hat bhis is a com-
parison of uusuosicizec and unsupported snips ana it i s the
principal purpose of this comparison to inves .' ;. e the com-
petitive posture of a nuclear powered bulkcargo vis-a-vis
a conventional one
.
Figures 6 and 9 present the comparative .. ires of
merit for ship utilizations of 70? 80, nd 957^. Required
freight rate (RPR) is the ordinate in dollars per long
ten and is obtained by dividing the sum of annual operating
cost and capital recovery cost 'oy the annual ti\ . >rt cap-
acity .
As stated in the concepts of this study, to be comp-
etitive, the minimum R'f'R of the nuclear ship mu; be eeual
to or less than the minimum RPR f the. conventional ship,
it is seen that at no point over this range of utilization
does tne nuclear minimum RPR become ecual to or less tnan
the minimum conventional j . for the same utilization.
The nuclear alternative is not competitive with the oil
firee ship. It can be said that as power is increased,
the competitive gap is closed and that if the . 3ed existed
for sufficiently high power, tne nuclear ship would be the
better alternative;.. It can also be observed that as ship
utilization increases, the locus of economic cross over





























icicle Xil is a consolidated economic analysis 02' the








; o 21 , 205,840 025,383,252
.—
; —w— -—/_ - i --..^i.,
Annual Operating Costs:
"'ages 8585- 81 : 30
Subsistance 30,1. 30,050
ivlaintenance & Repair 177 058 177,063
Stores & Oupplies 18,507
Total Insurance 217 269,517
Overhead & Miscellaneous 50,642 50,542
^ort Expenses 26,515 26,613
i?uei 573,596 2^-6,658
_,~procio.tion 848,233 '. .015 .525
Total: Annual Operating Cost 2,326,969 552,477,864
CHI? 0.1750 0.1750
Capital Recovery Cost 53,711,022 $4,442,065
Total Annual Cost 5,037,951 $6, 919, 929
^nnual Transport Capacity (11 )jj 181.450 195,835
Uli/IT) 3.27 o;p,; - ,-




economic ai r - in
. discloses an important fact. .... ;h ie s_ugie
exception of wages, all costs that are high . for the
nuclear ship are directly rel . to construction cost,
and within constru n costs, the pre. ruin . : factor is
bhe difference between the cost of the nuclear machinery
plant and the convention. ihinery plant.
rue advantages of fuel cost and tr. at capacity
make it unnecessary that the nuclear inachiner; lant cost
bo equal to The conventional machinery plant cost before
economic parity is reached. A reduction of 2:3-1-,,, would
1c enough. The Lnt is however, th; she cost of the
secondary syi of the nucle --•-'./ plant La-
tiveiy fixed; therefore, bhe reduction would nave to co s
almost entirely from a decrease in the cost of the nuclear
steam supply system. It is not realistic to think that
a reduction of this magnitude will happen.
.—though the cost of the nuclear steam supply system
would decrease through the economies of volume production
ana the learning functions associated with any new tech-
nology, they will he offset oy rising labor ana material
costs. Discussions with vendors indicate that nuclear
costs are rising faster than conventional costs because
of the special skills .. exotic materials associated
with nuclear technology.
In tne opinion of the author, merchant snip nuclear
power must look to factors other than reduction in uuc-
clear machinery plant cost for its future. a. ' ally,
it must find that environment where nigh pa 3r ana util-
ization are required because these factors are the sine




A « x "L r 1 S G
The s ....... .ry of the precedi] irt of this study con-
cluded that construction cost was the c£ .1 cause for
the non-competitive position of ahe nuclear alternative,
mrposi it, del mine t! raag-
niaude of the reduction of nuclear construction cost nee-
essary ac acnieve a compeaaaive s oaaus and second, "^o ex-
amine the economic environment of the competition in or-
der to identify those factors which influence ahe aoaen-
u_ ci^_ a a Lnmen u Oj. uius soaous.
This purpose is achieved by a sensitivity analysis
of those model inputs whic r re .listically ch n able.
iy analyses were conducted; ahe majority were discarded
because they were not clearly roali^aio expect . ns or
the variation of inputs could not be accepted in isola-
tion from other factors. All analyse de scribed in this
part v/ere conducted at a ship utilization of 95~fi for rea-
sons previously explained.
3 . Construct : .on Cos" cxion A - ! j i
s
In this analysis, the ccnearacaicn cosa of ahe nuc-
ciear ship was reduced from 0-25^ in 5$ increi ;s with
ail other factors held constant. The purpose of the analy-
sis was "vw de srmine mo percentage reduct: n necessary
to %uC^ the uiclear ship on a competitive par with the
conventional. au^ results are presented in figure 10.
As indicated in the results of operation, ahe minimum
RJYR for the nuclear ship occurs at abcua 20000 SHP; this
minimum RYR power is shown as a vertical line in Pigure
10 lor reference. As ahe figure indicates, a roeucrmou
si about ?><> in the construction cosa of ahe nuclear ship
would cause tne nuclear R.YR to erual the minimum
the conventional ship (033»27) anus seating ahe condition
for economic parity. A reduction of '" ' equates tc abcua
&1.S million dollars but .. _areseras on. i P 0$« of ahe dif-
ference in construcaicn cc ~as of ahe two snips, ahe con-
U.C1G;
....
L/'U ajJjAiX O Z jitil
•
o J
elusion is, of course
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decree
the nuclear snip to be equal to she
the conventional before economic par
ent on construction, cost st;
~~cior. ana cap - scovery
;
."
bcl; |gs oi iTuCiO i.r xueJL cost and anni
Commerce
• ace j
i - - '.'an-
lysis is an .n ion oi Secion 1005 of
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ruction oi the proposed nuclear-
j^j
. • wo .-u— o *>._. ij^ o'^ 66/1 ^*-.w ap o j can o
I U. U llliCli b — U_ U--C Oo
powered merchant cnip, and ...ay
to pay the con ractor ( not "... applicant 4 all
?t of, the excess of the cost o~






t of constructing a comparable convent-
in the uniteo. States* • •
. ed ship in the united States over ti
iona.
-ce. , I the Secretary of oommer
e s no o in—pays ail of the exec.,., described above, but do
elude -the provision of the bill Per the waiver or re
tion el AEG ... ;es for the use _ source ane special
CLUC —
Lclear . ri 1 s (ioC ' 'I c iP Q r> vo
ill ) in the operation e.
five years of operation*
-ale completed snip fer The fi: t
lie resales of this analysis are presented in Figure
11. 1"; can le seen that if the construction cost offset
provisions of the bill v re uti"
tent authorized j the nuclear ship ie economically
to the convention, even wi-fc
ce e o
s
sup er i o ~
reductior in firs -^ fuel
He conclusions of this anaiy are , that for
"ace tyne shir) under study ana the ; "otions sec forth
the proposed legislation contains "over lei As a mat-
ter of interest, xs support 3 d ly this bill at the
minimum RPR point (20C00 Sill) is abou"c $4-7 million dol-
lars exclusive of fuel offset.
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Ijj 1;! j! :;:
. .1, ' , ... ;. ii
'
Tne cumulative average cos -: 01 identical snips con-
1 LCiJ- JXUU.U.O uJ-O.
Sf - - i 1cn 2
c . -
.«nere: uv = trie cumulative average cost per snip
for K shi -
0. - the construction cost oi ti first ..hip
:. sr oi sni~os to Dnstr' ea
= tne learning coemcient wmen varies
win i. mplexity of the £ .:
^ni "orior experience oi i fii] "ara
Couch suggests a value of of 0.^7 for b for general
cargo ships built in United States shipyards- This .tea
;o a learning iuncti< 0~ J 'J • P/^3 tner words- eacn time
the number of snips constructed doubles., the cost of each
ship is reduced by 93«5^o
Using these relations! i; the construction cost of
the nuclear ship reduced according to the learni]
function associated with multiple shi i accuisition and the
sux^s "oresen'jea m _i . £o T t "• p y\ "p p p p p yi tV; a t
i— »- significantly redu< for multiple nys 4 She quan-
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823,397,904-
$22,896,896
latio of k\ - . ;e Cos -




































'Tic es oi muxtipi . . Qip ac< i oion
i.c ciD ciVci-L_.ci.J-LC CO the C011 1 Sx'iip 8.3 they are "uO
nuclear. inc point of this : y Y. . s to indicate
t multiple buy is one oi the w; y )y which the construc-
tion COS' nuclear snip cc.n oe reauced.
- - i!2J : X"-Q- 1'rip tance a
Round trip dis' 2 analysis is a powerful demon—
st of ot 1 ' economic envisv
. Lt factors on the cc lition of xhz nuclear
ship vis-a-vis the conventional. In this iteration, the
round tri dj ;tance is varied over a ran,;- 1 5,030 -
24 , COC,' n ical miles in inc.. .ts of 5,000 miles.
lite results are indicated in Pi
;
re 13 • ' _naae of
this figure is the RPR oi the nuc. ship divided by
the RP ' the conventional; thus a ratio of '. means
tnan
onaTi is —.j s
;
j
that the freight rate of the nuclear is 4- c/° hi -
the conventional, a ratio of 0.97 mean
lower and '. CO is parity
_t can ~> seen tnac ae voyage distance is dec eisoc.,
the advant. ge moves decidedly in favor of tne convention-
al snip. Secondly, at any ;iven voyage ; nee, as pow-
is increased tne ratio decreases moving the advantage
towards the nuclear snip
only at hi i sower levels and for aiotanooo of 5 , 000






•eview 01 tnooe 00 ; 1 .ctors --tn^r airectiy or in-
directly dependent on voyage distance is helpful ir































































slow n • v . Ling indication of
= magnitude of change J of these fac* rs as the
r suit of change in voyage distance.
( : . . .
\
S, <j I — UOU Drlir >
Ocbi ^\ri. i0 ii;.: ou^w ..... GiiAi-iG-i
.
Port Expenses* 26,613 S 92 , COS +$65,396
Oil Fuel og-"; .... 3 7 3,5' 8 3 2 2 , 9 3 -..; 50,693
Nuclear Fuel Cost 32 58' $213,189 -$33,4-69
Oil Fuel Weight 2 ? $ 74-8 -
.Nuclear Puel-Y/eight -
Conventional Cargc Capacity 36 5 C 38,245; +
Nuclear Cargo Capacity 38)853 33^553
hound drips tor Year* 5*04 17.4-3 +
Sea lays per Year --- :, 52o 284-





at 6000 miles, numb r of days at sea has been reduced
significantly and each cay the snip is not at sea cuts
tnt o tn i. s aa ,rant ag e <.
dale analysis adas another dimension ' z the criteria
for nuclear ship competition nuclear ship must do at
sea to exploit her advantages of fuel cost and transport
capacity. Over short routes, h lower ar^ high ship ut-
ilization are not enough. The reactor must be utilized.
'A\bane tor ootn ilteri .3
Ihe a_erease in voyage distance is traumatic te the
nuclear ship. he shorter the distance;, the less fuel the
conventional must carry,, the less fuel sh. must carry, the
more space is available for cargo, file other somewhat
"hidden'1 ' effect is equally important: although the nuclear
ship still noIds e. fuel st ana cargo capacity tdv,
74
_^ "C
i( L-TJ.CO; '::. i -.a
kesidual fuel oil is a by-product &: The cru - ii
process an use ! er c "' on convention-
al ships is one of the principal uses of .ual f
The basic i of the price of residual oil are
sue cci". of transportation, the demand for refined oil
proaucxs in relation ".o the cost; of reducing ' yield
of residual in the crude o_a_ cracking process, the sup-
ply and demand within a given geographic area are. moss
important, the price of competing fuels such as natural
29*
*o ancx cOi— .
i'or the purposes of this study, it h been assumed
that The price of bunker ".c" on the oasT coast of th :
United States is ^2.15 per ' rrei based on in lation
fro... the U.S. Coast G-uard. Per reasons thai; will be cost
explained in 'the follow: g Part, this price will certain-
ly increase with Tine
She purpose of this analysis is to fine that price
of bunker "
~
;; that would of itself, cause the nuclear
ship so be competitive with the conventional alternative.
The price of bunker !I c" was v - d in sne model fro:.: the
assumed value to 0i>-00 per be . in increments of £0.50
wnile holding all Dther factors constant,
fne results of this analysis are plotted in figure
H« The curve labeled •1""' is the graph of the nuclear
snip ufa Dver The power range investigated. The other
curves arc conventional 111 ls for the b"L "c n
price indicated. With the minimum nuclear RPR occurring
as 20000 Sri?, it can be observed that if the pi oe of
bunker "c" were to increase slightly above 04-
barrel, ere chips woulc. be on a competitive par. It is
of course
, a static analysis as far as tne nuclear ship
is concerned* As indicated previously, costs for nuclear
technology are rising faster th r conventional tech-
nology ana. to the exte that this trend continues, tne
analysis ,~c^ value only in a static sen.. Nevertheless,
this factor is changeable, will ci and : >me ef in-
creasing importance as fossil fuel reserves decrease.
75
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/Txich. compares uwo exist - teen—
_-l ^ C Ci b J. Dill
nologies v/ould 3 incomplete v/iti some examination 01
•the future, Lc rl; of the two technolo ss
is relatively irn] .. .out. The purpose of this p rt oi the
fuels r sw-
ing com of the estimates and forecasts of fossil energy
supoiy and demand, The knowledge that; fossil fuel res-
erves are finite is intuitive, tne - native value 01
remaining ri^rvesis so:: ' ing of a shock.
d. 1C O bcl LiIJLC <J. vJ _ ^~* A "CO]
-o. ^om-
.... ion in ... cch of '.
.
the 1




. . .we must exuenci our naoionaj-
order to
O o ;ources oase in
ord—
•J_* Cmgiy,
naro. loox c* ^ ^
UO ..»_ ^ —J Oommis ion snouia take ... new ana
ne roie oi nuci iower in w L ^ ^:onu-uy » <, ,36
'
... commission responaea 'emoer or tine same year
v/i on a repoi luOl l/lc(l) C _ . _ c- - . . ._ ^ &X j. .. - A >or
co "Cio rresiaent .. X XI c ua ud Ox j. ci. u lOl. - i o W j_ Oj-i, I. c; o *J c U uO
b _. v, oId_^- ti-Ci' gy * >erve . ^o J.
.
... OXJ-Ci -j ~
Commi s si oneo assessme ..i oi "cne cumulative consump-
tion ana resources ci tossn .3 in "Che united btates is
presented in Pigure 15.
loll '-"--.. ,-- ,.. -..•-- -• _ „ No ^ _ w ^ \ „ u L J il J
The ordinate of the figure is in
01 11 _ ^ L/^J. CJ IV-
/-...-- \
aient oi one oillion-oiiiion r>ritisn Tnermai oni"Cs ^'I'uj or
on o en o r . 'y avai ia o _l < ... - j ^__-_w_. u OxiS w_ avcicLj-jd iii^ii
—
,
— ^-.^ c o c
. ^ b
-\ ^
>sil ene ; r rcsourc, o: — <^ o
inc.ico.ici oy one oj_oc.-:o on oi.e oar rigni oi mo ngure.
me o^> cimaxe oi . o • «i is mo.o oi "cne ijepar*cmen"C oi me
mimioi
,
while that of 2^-oC, Q io derived or implied -'mi
reports "by the Committee on Natural Resources of .. Na-
tional Academy of lomncm, the Committee on Interior \
msu—r Axidir .- ie and ^co^c^icii
cvc Lie tin 1 126
.
le difference betwe :n fne two esti: . : \ ry large
-- is itly ^ue to v ion in the estimates of ; '.:;ar-
lurces" such as c in X) or at great
dep hsj differences* in th .lity and costs associa-
ted with recovery of marginal resources j ffer :cs in
;umptions about recover, ;ney. The Department of
the Interior believes that the 6Q of *vn res rves shown
in one—c es o— - ^g — s rocovsrao— e a c rese it cos ^s witn
known technology an • additional 25 . ~-~ the '24
.. of ma: .1 and 'ed l be recovered
at 10-lp/j higher costs provj th , ~:^ melogies
ociat . ith explor extraction are improved
tnrou n researcn»
>o oO years during wnicn the average men se in annual
fuel consumption was 2.04-$. 3 is an extrapolation
of an estimate for the year '. . made fy the IT. tional
x'uels nd _iiiior ne Committee on Int -?icr and
— .
-^ u _ ar i-.iiairSj J « o e in .t e <> x )Oxaoionis s a s s o.
on an annual r oi psp^— acion grov'/tn on ana a . »oy°
annual rate of increase in c ta use rve C assumes
a decrease in population growt ate and a decrease in
.e rate of per capita consumption
Trie .onnissicr : s report assesses ~;hese data as follows:
•--3 can "i: m. different combinations of the es -:-
i tes of fuel reserves and of cumulative ^.z^^ would pre-
dict that, if no supple ry forms of energy were util-
ized, we would exhaust our readily available, low-cost
.plies of fossil fuels in from 75 to 100 years and our
ssently visualized total supplies in from '30 to 200
years. •• 26
This assessment seems to be based more on Curve G
it is a conservative forecast for the remaining life span
of fossil energy reserves in the United States.
2.00 j- / X
^
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li'iC U • O u- GO -i-C
,
DGIIcioG Ji LI -J "J —;S
bureau c_ Lines ana
'-..^- 3 Oi OltUilj . — 0US CGa_
V. J. in ar j esti
^jO'u"i 5 • 1 trillion ,o:is as o_^ January 194-4, sufficient for
iriy 54-00 .. at a of production approx-
! itin ' one maxj-mui.r ue m "one past - o^e m: i -ens -
V'
r
-i — . . - -
» J_ ^-- <^ u O-- u ;.._-.. .. , _ ^ ^ b G ^
2CS
2.tement coincsaea co a:, extraorainary a
i e i a o >ne a
o c~ c ^j a w, _ e ) u.n o o _^ *j w o._
Stat s s within
tons ,
by . oiV. a ^ ; . i/nj. C-_
- -<j.-^ ^i
;ne '_ ac e a \j j « , UJ.U u.
-^ 9
at 6? Q « Comparing th /'ith the 5 Q of known /es
es li atea ..
,
one _~utcrssr .Department siiown _..
the U -— has revised its e: te of known reserves down-
;en in 15 years
.
C . ..eric. _s
L\e ii
•
- - Atomic Energy Commis-




sien requested r.Ir. Palmer Putnam, noted authority on ene
sources ana reserves, to couduc~: a study of tne maximum
plausible worla de-anas for energy ever the next one hun-
ar^a years- s analysis concentrated en the two
facter^ that are the ee.oie determinants of global energy
demand - population increase and avera
;
..r capita con-
sumption ef energy. ;nam tc ok th . vie .nt of a hypo-
thetical trustee of 1
his analysis would represent the cautious approach to such
a cnar t er
»
Putnam's ma urn plausible curves of cumulative fuel
C^n -^ — - -. v-/< -~ -- - y-, -^ /- »^ ^j -^ -^ r-j c^ r>. V T* ~ esv.- r are oasea
on tne ex'oe< SSOnS OilE o - -
. e oie en;
owecij
OU'-i >UT •-.- OG DGTWGCn 2 J?'/ *
,2;
m . c -
curs ivecurv ea arc ; 01
consumption oi en corrcspo: , tu ^iC
growuh ra ,es of > , 5y^. 1'he upper Z e area
.
. ;g to a populnt - in a v/orL
n. of 8000 million by 2050 and the lower limit i
Z&K.C CL O O C i C
!
L _ ^ r puuu mij.j.1 or. oj' ...
In addition to foreca world cemana lor ene
Putnam estimated tne he jcnT^ut oi one ^otai. v;or_c re-
serves of economically rec< - le* fossil fuels to oe as
set for^X in 'labie XV oelow.









Comparing Pi lam's estimates of energy supply a
mand indicates an outage of economically recoverable
fossil fuel reserves at some 1 Le in t . . O O ,-^_ lj er
oi "cne n xt nxury
^nventionai sour _ ^. bJ.pt.1 ^C-.O b LI u uo
nuclear energy
.--3 c~ ...a. o o — in oer Putnam estimated that of
ie 52 Q of Total world reserves of coal the united
states nelo. b, v/incn _s . e • -.i v» p -~ r
Interior Department as "known resources' 1 in ligure 15.
^Recoverable ao costs no hi ;her . Lan 1 »5 times '.150 costs
;as c^n^. no nigner tnan twice i y:?u cc^ts for








; . .. of the wil - r is in or
this i economic co; 'ison of a merchant snip




'ihu roleurn . in the c< ntal U*3<.
. ;ed to be 2o billion crels in 1950 while un-
discovered oil was d to .veen 4-6 and 60 bil-
lion be-rrele* Annual U.S. co] on du ; this s.
t e period v; .; Dout 2.5 -- 'rels. . r . it n
for the hugh imports of crude oil iron other ecu
-; United St .n iffiei . ie heat con-
tent of proved and undis oil reserves is about
0.5 Q« A review of Figi :e 15 indicates that oil reserves
2.1/e a, u. oe d.o ojlo jti v^^ w u.j- uc „_ iOSSi.1 r <i ^c;_ v o .
: J i 1 "; j3j3
Putnam's estimates of "cho he. t content of the world
reserves of cil and ^as consic.cruc to bo recoverable a -:
costs no higher than about 1 ;. times 1950 cco^s are sum-
iiid. L/iCU J-j.1 j. C~ .-* — C AV i UclUvi
TABLE
)RLL OIL-GAS SS^
iTovea ^noiscoveroc. — v^ UO._
Uni Led States 0.25
,
o 2p " >
s tern '0.11 0.9 1.0
Hemis
'let Union 0.04 1.3 '. '_.
Kiddle ^ast 0.57 1.1 1 .7
A— Other Regions J. 02 C 3 5
- : -• - ~ Q
CO
10 1.i£.kC ma u CQ £ . ' C 1 JL
,
one CO n_
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. orcenxage 01 v/c
our ,jor so 1 ?..o_ energy
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;
reo. during Tn cs«
>ns for tl'
c bo fo;
•^j a ^ ^ .
— ^- ^ „ .
.
:e "co on no.
in ied economics- Li-
quid am lueis are Lereiore cneape:
o o ox "jr ana tr : Lr oolid coun-
CJreaoer economy m oon-
version to mechanical work
bunker ; ' o " oil for ex
in ease ^_ ooa_i_ versus
Jat v. oi
li.J.%11 — _ o auu - iil'Ij'/pound while <j~ u \j *.
bunker !I c i; is 18,500 BTU/pound. v
.lion .. ecu o r ~ j p o o » c o w.o o _ ^Oi preference o
_
. t an o"v .t to sayconventional snips, it i
that it rare occu .ip on tri .as
today that is no -: burrin" oil- Figure 18 shows the meta—
norpno sn
1 9 1 4- i
,..^_ ^._. . coal i— iron
. :ne orciin . . : ss t -ago ne
v/orl snips, it can sen tnax as " ;onn oi
v/orld ships increased iron lion torn in 1914 to
'. 53 --
to Tno almost Total exclusion oi' coal.
J. O.J-' ... CciJ—
-J/
.lion tons in 1964? oil one tl . .
ui* . i i-i.ugu.tj L> . > g o j cne -JO
oi i'rans'oo: ' _ W - - — ^> '^v^O^* ior ; oi commercial snip-
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technology which st . that by the r r 204-3 3 ocoan
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C~ illCi ,! O j. O.J.J. _discovery Oj. a monumental su.Uj
by oThor uoors of oil to some o" 'orm of energy, one













;o be . follow 3:.
z.
)he world is ruiinin ssii .;;/- -"-
.s n .nt thai' v; inooim the
, year when 1 i ev
;n to Know i u
ctisxariciy.
. Dt "COO
lie world is running out p "^ .
ergy forms ioecause cor, are showi: an incr eg
prGi'ire^co for oil here _.. less of it.
If the present trend continui
s
oil production will
have "oo double every tv;elv> . ...rs and re er 1
oe exnaustea in _ess zn a c C'T." j
in ": of oi_ aepie -
tr; ns"oor" tii
.iIs most n . ly on.On J. O L. O 1..W OU i-^O-V L.
J
uO a major i»^ ex ^^riw og-
ives as ii source of motive ;y. 'I'he
effect of oil depletion on automobiles and aircraft
boggles the imagination
i / 1 onin ' r i c l . >l on • • nave i— s uag
—
gering ^JJ^^z en Lch rely almost exclusively
on resio.ua! o. lor n«
5<- As oil reserves decline, ti 'ice of oil produe"
wia.1 increaseciDC ao ID! ex urac ^ _ c n c s
'
r_3c m one searen nor r .is ana xne _c.
pply and demand take z^-^^'z.
the price of oil incr.
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tiesu . . itages for Ihe
At die .' me , one study indicams tnax ii there i
a competitive envirc b for . .... r pow-
.
.• it; //ill take the form of . hi ;.. .. :', lor. ^oe
route ship designed ;ructed to in
tumarc i .
c is equal . essent; 't of
this environment that . be land for
in order to a . ... . to put
. nuclear ship on a coj c e com en-
tional alternative.
bility of ... ;ry so til-
ization can be deij se condition -t
met
5
... 2 for nuclear
chant marine of th s " itil xne
cosx of residual oil 1 . . no ;ive.
»w» — - *..
The ce vision "go . c; c yiu. iticus entry into
the field ol merchant ship nuclear power rests then,
the tent to which these ccn-_tions exist; or can be per-
ceived. Le're arc indications th . -
-g -
The speed of ships .. :ea in ocean cor; rce is con-
mtiy increasing. Le aver .... .-. . lips
is 8-10 knots in 1920, 14-16 k in 1940 and 15-20
ns in I960. Present i. ig for some snip construe-
31tion calls ior snips capable of 2> knots. ' ;r r
not t] rejections for in the early 1970'
s
2 a • for specu" tion, butare valid or not
trend towards speea o\ ' ;y years is a mas-
ter of fact a I where there is a i rement for high
-o*
speea, onere is a require for hifch power
.
--.--.
requires j - ; the oni -;ce
of r for /er . Ls ' —
'
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ships ever built. 2ach shi .1 37, 'eet ;tn
and each '..ill have a deck c rgc . Livalent to t\
football fields in 1 Lde.
l carry up to 2,75 million cu 1 .c feet of cargo -eport-
.y the equivalent of V . itional carriers of
j C4 design. They - iift-o
barge or co .tainerized,
.
rgoes.
uled to cca, lie :
designed to cruise at 2 i j
;inc . c:.g oi n ._•::_-
isable shipping corpor lillion
dollars in the lease of
;
'Brooklyn ] vy
?d to bulla commercial ship; -vo a^r^c: c ips
for Seatrain's own operations are sci to be built
during 'ir a year of operation, la oilities are
large enoaga ao construct shi] s as large as 200
s
000 1 a
tankers. J -1 M. ?ack
v
President si Seat i has de-
clared that 3eatrains is in aas large shi .assss. vy
The Advanced Marine Technology Division of the liaaon
Systems Corporation aas that present technology
is s 'ficient as caiia ;anker d ao 1,C DO tons an
forecasts that within the asaa fifteen years, tankers in
the • )GO-600
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tion of la sort time is '
;
brsv a.t about by i up-
dating of port facility srnization of cargo
handling methods.
ilic lOCi— . . . . . . .-._/*,.- v.; '.. . , r —
snip. ../i/ ... joj-U; cne Juui.-
'omotren o; - j o r 6 .^ u j
.j
s sated c for ;i so c-
i bion in ;, 2 n ; hip is
s* He r 'tei at in 1 9 6 7 5 ie 100,000 con-
tort of Rotter alone and that
rtter ;\vo
j t i o a
.
is
us cructi iig 2 thir
tiie . - . . ion 01 the P02 ;
,v st priv j :h inc! > a
700 acre contai 'snip .n ..in 1968. and
i by Alii a '. ort Industries, the .11
(ortedly 0,. 'gest : >ing complex in
.e
ou' :1 million dollars for contains ? : ng
mile long capable of
accommodating
On 'i land
lor a contain Lip ter Port ol L -'.
ior conxamerizea : moving ne
Far East. Cargo arriving at eit of the brid ;e
wil: be transshipped 'ail across the Units! States
2 longer ::.orc expensive passage thro;
the P, ..Am rt is also bui. a con-
tainership tern]
.
in L >rn, Italy. Lditional con-
tainer terminals are under co iction in iV seliawken,
. Jerse lana .lifornia a: . .1.
The con tion of contai] Is is being
mat i by the construction of container .ips. fa .oaioion
to tno Seatrain pia: .; sracts to-
taling some ;<i;0 million dollars were negoti veern
aoan Pr ident I ' and the
Parrel lines for three - four co ler a. lit:
cargc .alas respecti"\ : rr of IS
£n , -j iized and p< .11 - ;izc :
oti :r me b ... .. : i .si • t>
l te in port
se and incre; - i] Lon. :se include li.ft-
on/oii, roli-on/olf ;-on/off co; - as. The latter
1 variations but all invol^ Le principal of
unloadij , rgo from h-cos*b big ships into 'low-
cost ss h : ii . . • : --- -- L s delive
tiie cai'go to bhe port of disi .vhile bhe big ships
re on their /ay «c nc ne t >rt 3 "cleaning up 11 as nec-
essary in transit.
, >ent in pc ' and unloading cargo
or waiting to be loaded or unlo; 'ease; the primary
utility of snip transportation and thus pro.' The
signs are that world s. - sts are oo sorne-
Lng - The goals ar h ing in ter;
.o i s and a .nt increase in the num-
ber day 3 ship is at sc ii . revenue dollars.
These data are oho . ;ns ohoo oho maritime
world is inning to gras] .e ccn: of a transpor-
tation system in which the is seen in The -ogecoive
of a sub-system whose function it is oo move cargo by
;er, rather than an economic eroioy in its 1. If one
of this total sy; ccncepo continue oo move to-
wards increasing speed, larger cargo capacit .eereasi
"turnaround time and higher vessel utilization, io may
well be that the ship sub-system that best meets one needs
ano requirements of ohis conceoo will also meeo one con-
aioions for competitive merchant shio nuclear power.












to a proven sec-
ond; cy ; ;'i in the 50,00C - 300 SHP range . Ln-
corp .- 2 . so _..'. portant ~co
:onoLiic deployment on merchant ships, including:
'.
. Ca ' ibiiitj oi volume .....
2. Simi! by oi" fuel ^„oi^n to cen ... tion power
2 • Light weij jh.t -
. Low \
p. nign relu.aDi i"
6. Simplicity ' .on an intern
7 . • . ;-; .
In-hull rad: ;ive ;te disposal faciliti
- ^ ^ .
.
-
Installation of the nucl ' . oupply system
cosi^n eve,, out of th nd develo] .. . pro-
. in a series of selected merchant ships.
:ju in cre\ - -A constructi ..
of privately own • i-cinn facil . ... re-
vie /, ship in cy and such
other peri] cal ;ions as necessary in order to in-
jure the high reliability and ni^n utilization of mater-
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reduction of t - l order ~co . .ize the
s of gr ' carg . )acity and lower nuclear
Lei cost through incr* . ....
2. That parxici] 'czie ii
xion of 2d nuclc ... .....
on a series of ships constructed on a multiple :qui-
isis s u xhax economies of voiur.ie can he




. d "n. construction of ships.
j. fhat participating snipov/ners ui:.o:n\;rauS that a via^
commercial demam ..'on a series of ships with
the characteristi ... :ribed in order to i • the
gree of ship utilization ne ;ary to econc. compe-
"cixicn witn coiivenxronaj. msia^_ai_cns
.
. :se conditions are not 6.esigned to be an arbitrary
set of impositions on . cs. First 'ors-
b, tney are the condi"*
. ;o economic parity
hips of the same characteristics. Sec-
ond! dollar amount of public monie: ivoived in such
progr;— re \ :. oi^ities f .ccess be
.
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put .d to the inter hin the
gov
. is now c and at least in part
r s onsib] the state of c l an i: 'ra;
exists in bhi .-itime b.io
connection,, this st r Aon c'
the fi r y of l: n that he functions
the . 'erred their
pro. tion in .. . to the
mt r .on sr to te ti
port of "one
L
I": is the c ;udy that if
. ch a adequately
.pported, the 2conomic a -
vantages in the . ..r.oe of pay-
its deficit. of . srt d ,rs,
higher tax reve on of support over
Arc lich . mo-
i ; ;o • .n time of n
of pr t nuclear power economics in
merch .nt ship; li i. : is an
techncl
. ri must take its correct place en tne list
of co ri rities. 2 - it is also nec-
1 respect for t >m of future
. ime ccc, .ile t r cannot sol'
the present crisis in the Unit. lant marin
.tent of competing
;ion ?e to recogni emergence of a u
concept in trans-oceanic c ad failure to
the transcendent : .ct of c epletion may
2 a new ar ... -re -
that c^ being driven from the seas again by an uncompet-
itive technology.
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